

Global Justice: A Proposal for International Tariff System

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Summary

In this paper, I shall propose an original index for tariff system in the light of the idea of global justice, based on a strong version of capability approach. When a nation achieves a certain level of human capabilities, such as educational opportunity, or gender empowerment, it would be better to decrease the rate of tariff for exported goods from that nation. Based on this idea, nations would be given a good incentive to improve people's capability conditions in order to earn money from international trade. I shall present an index for this constitutional setting of tariff rates.

1. Introduction

Among various interpretations on global justice of distribution, a capability approach seems to be the most persuasive in theory and the most stimulating in reforming our practice. From a capability approach, global justice for distribution is defined as "an equal development of capability for all people in the world." Amartya Sen's weak conception of capability is not such a thing, but we shall inquire a strong version of capability approach in terms of global justice.

Assume that the idea of global justice for distribution is led by the idea of "realization of human capability allover." This means that the ideal state of global justice is the full realization of human capability: each human being realizes its latent capability as much as possible, and each kind of capability is realized in people as many as possible. When people in the world have enough chances to realize their full capability, such a condition is an ideal state of global justice.

This idea is a strong version of global justice in capability approach (I call it "spontaneization approach"). It focuses not only on income but also on people's rights to access to various chances for realizing human capabilities. Global justice for distribution here is not only the matter of redistribution of income but also the matter of various rights: for example, improvement of linguistic ability, obligatory education, health conditions, education for democracy, women's liberation and so forth. We assume that the ideal state of global justice would be realized, when every kind of rights for human capability is realized in its full level. This idea is of course idealistic but is a leading idea or a maxim for reforming international tariff system. This paper

investigates what kind of tariff system (or tariff policy) can be constituted in the light of a strong version of capability approach.

2. Simple Idea

For the time being, we cannot expect enough authorities (governments) in the world to enforce nations and groups to realize a high level of human capability. Thus we would have to think about such an alternative idea that gives nations an incentive to improve their conditions for realizing human capabilities with constituting a rule for the rates of tariff in international trade. For example, when a nation realizes a certain level of capabilities, we would decrease the rate of tariff for exported goods from that nation. Whereas, a nation does not realize a certain level of capabilities, we would not permit to decrease the rate of tariff or we would even increase it. Based on this idea for adjusting tariff rates, nations would be given a good incentive to improve people's capability conditions in order to earn money from international trade. In other words, nations would have good incentives to cultivate their human capitals, all of which are not necessarily linked with economic dimensions. I would like to investigate an international rule for adjusting tariffs with reference to the idea of a strong version of capability approach on behalf of global justice.

3. DeMartino's proposal

First, I shall examine DeMartino's proposal of a tariff alliance. Although his concern is led by an international egalitarian perspective and is different from mine, his idea is stimulating and worthwhile to examine. In order to comprehend his theoretical contribution and develop it from our strong capability approach, let us see his theoretical essence briefly.

DeMartino [*Global Economy, Global Justice: Theoretical Objections and Policy Alternatives to Neoliberalism*, London: Routledge, 2000, pp.219-244] proposes a new framework of tariff system, which he calls "Social Index Tariff Structure = SITS." His aim is to approach the idea of an equal distribution of income in a worldwide scale by using a new index for international tariff structure. He proposes that a certain international organization should control rates of tariffs in international trade by referring two basic indexes: one is a degree of equalization of income in a domestic level, and the other is a degree of development of human capabilities. More specifically, he proposes a synthetic index for tariff adjustment by using (1) human development index (in annual report of United Nations Development Programme), (2) gender index, and (3) index of income inequality.

"Human development index" is as itself a synthetic one, which is made up from three indexes: welfare, life expectancy, and educational attainment. "Welfare" here refers to "Gross Domestic Product per capita" but adjusted in a certain way so as not to count high income too relevant. For example, average income in France is five times as much as in Poland, but we don't count that welfare in France is five times as much as

in Poland. In this case, we count that welfare in France is 1.2 times as much as in Poland. We adjust the value of Gross Domestic Product per capita to calculate a relevant welfare index: high level of income is not so much relevant to the level of welfare.

“Life expectancy” is a simple index but it is interesting to see how life expectancy is related to human development. Life expectancy reflects conditions of health, nutrition, and institutions of health care. According to DeMartino, life expectancy is empirically related to “a degree of income equality” rather than “Gross Domestic Product per capita.” For example, GDP per capita in Brazil in 1994 was higher than that in Bulgaria, but the degree of both life expectancy and equalization of income in Bulgaria was higher than in Brazil.

The index of “educational attainment” is measured by the attainment of basic literacy and the substantive enjoyment of educational opportunity. This index is important because it is an index of capability to make people achieve their own life. It is related to realization of various human capabilities more than the idea of income equalization.

These three indexes (welfare, life expectancy and educational attainment) constitute an index of human development but they don't directly tell us anything about the matter of inequality of income or the matter of gender. DeMartino then introduces two additional indexes for the sake of counting substantive equality: “Gender-related Development Index” and “Income Equality Coefficient.”

By using Gender-related Development Index, DeMartino takes into account the matter of gender gaps in welfare, life expectancy and educational attainment. On the other hand, by using Income Equality Coefficient, his concern directs to the gap of income between highest 20% and lowest 40% in each nation. DeMartino adjusts the date of index of human development with additional concern for these two indexes, and composes his original synthetic index, which he calls “Equality-means adjusted HDI = EMAHDI.” The EMAHDI is composed by “Human Development Index,” “Gender-related Development Index,” and “Income Equality Coefficient.”

Using the EMAHDI, DeMartino divides nations into five ranks (see figure 1) and proposes the following rules for adjusting rates of tariffs: when nations export their goods to the higher ranked nations, 5% tariff should be imposed. On the other hand, when nations export their goods to the equally or lower ranked countries, no tariff needs to be imposed by the international authority.

This idea is quite simple and stimulating for constituting a global justice from the perspective of international egalitarianism. When we introduce DeMartino's rule for tariff system, those countries that have already attained equality and human development in high level cannot import goods and services without extra tariffs from countries that have not yet attained them in high level. In DeMartino's system, those countries in lower ranks would have incentive to promote both equality in income and human development because they can expect to lower the rate of tariff. When the extra

tariff is discharged, the amount of international trade would increase and it would bring economic profit to the nation.

DeMartino's proposal stated above gives nations incentives to reform their social conditions in order to get more profit from international trade. Those countries that can reform their domestic conditions politically in terms of human capabilities would be able to make a success in economy at the same time. In reality, however, developing countries would have more incentives not to reform their social conditions for laborers since they have to keep their laborers' wage low in the name of economic competitiveness in world economy. Their government would not invest their budget to develop laborer's capability (or human capital) and as a consequence laborers would be content with their harsh working conditions. In order to improve laborer's condition and promote to cultivate a better life in their capability, it would be a good idea to promote nations to attain a high level of human development especially in labor class. DeMartino's proposal gives us great imagination for institutional settings for global justice since it promotes both equality in income and capabilities at the same time.

Figure 1: DeMartino's STIS Index

Tariff Band 1	Norway (0.764)	New Zealand (-0.108)	Nigeria (-0.869)
Slovakia (2.785)	Kazakhstan (0.754)	Australia (-0.113)	Honduras (-0.956)
Belarus (2.403)	Lithuania (0.697)	Switzerland (-0.147)	Malaysia (-0.965)
Tariff Band 2	Finland (0.671)	Bolivia (-0.177)	
Romania (1.736)	Lao People's Democratic	Jamaica (-0.226)	Tariff Band 5
Ukraine (1.659)	Republic (0.614)	Philippines (-0.244)	Dominican Republic
Viet Nam (1.622)	India (0.490)	United Kingdom (-0.361)	(-1.016)
Latvia (1.574)	Indonesia (0.447)	Hong Kong (-0.371)	Mexico (-1.052)
Poland (1.553)	Germany (0.344)	Algeria (-0.427)	Lesotho (-1.052)
Moldova, Republic of	Denmark (0.342)	Tunisia (-0.450)	Colombia (-1.071)
(1.430)	Israel (0.337)	Morocco (-0.540)	Kenya (-1.164)
Hungary (1.357)	Canada (0.317)	Singapore (-0.562)	Venezuela (-1.186)
Czech Republic (1.337)	Ghana (0.261)	Cote d'Ivoire (-0.591)	Zimbabwe (-1.209)
Slovenia (1.121)	Italy (0.250)	Peru (-0.596)	Guinea (-1.250)
Spain (1.120)	Pakistan (0.193)	Nicaragua (-0.657)	Chile (-1.323)
Sri Lanka (1.113)	France (0.172)	Uganda (-0.667)	South Africa (-1.365)
Sweden (1.074)	Egypt (0.098)	Thailand (-0.698)	Panama (-1.405)
Belgium (1.069)	Estonia (0.092)	Costa Rica (-0.744)	Senegal (-1.411)
Bangladesh (1.061)	China (0.065)	Mauritania (-0.782)	Guinea-Bissau (-1.499)
Japan (1.019)	Tanzania, United	Zambia (-0.796)	Brazil (-1.588)
	Republic of (0.021)	Niger (-0.812)	Guatemala (-1.593)
Tariff Band 3	Nepal (0.003)	Ecuador (-0.818)	
Netherlands (0.982)	Tariff Band 4	Russian Federation	
Bulgaria (0.856)	USA (-0.048)	(-0.869)	

4. Critical examination on DeMartino's proposal

However, DeMartino's proposal includes some fatal problems. I shall examine them and raise some significant modifications from both pragmatic and ideological reasons.

First, in his theoretical settings, high ranked nations would have incentives to take those policies that cause to lower their ranks: for example, they might increase the inequality of income, or they might reduce their budget for education. Slovakia, which is ranked in first group, would try to degrade its rank by decrease the value of human development or the value of coefficient of equality in income in order to import more goods from those countries that are ranked in second group. If a nation's rank is degraded, that nation could import more goods without extra tariff from low-ranked nations. Since there charges no extra tariffs among lower-ranked nations, high-ranked nations might try to degrade their ranks and to participate in the lower group. In order to avoid this degradation of ranks, we need to constitute an extra rule for tariff system: for example, those nations that degrade the value of EMAHDI should bear additional cost for running the international organization of tariff system.

Second, low-ranked nations would have an interest not to grade up their rank but to remain in the same rank and develop the international trade among those nations in the same rank. For example, since United States is ranked in forth group, many nations would have chosen to remain in the same rank to have a good relations with United States in international trade and they would not raise their value of human development or equality of income. But this is not what DeMartino intended. Theoretically, his proposal has a difficulty: it might not give incentives to the nations to grade their ranks. In order to avoid this consequence, we need to constitute an extra rule for tariff system: for example, even if nations degraded their ranks, they cannot reduce the rate of tariffs among low-ranked nations.

Third, in DeMartino's proposal, the criterion of grouping nations is arbitrary. Why the first rank group is demarcated from the second rank group in that way? Why the rate of tariff is fixes to "5%" between the first and the second groups? People might feel it is unfair both to demarcate the ranks in such a way and to put 5% tariffs in every case. In order to eliminate the feeling of unfairness, it would be a good idea not to divide nations into five ranks but adopt the following rules: when country A put x % tariff to country B, the country A has to put the tariff rate more than x % to the country C whose index is lower than country B. For example, when country A imposes 5% tariff on average to the goods from country B, country A has to impose more than 5% tariff on average to the goods from country C, when the index of country C is lower than that of country B. When we adopt this rule, there is no problem of demarcation of ranks and no problem of fixing the arbitrary rate of tariffs: each nation has a discretionary power to decide the rate of tariffs under the condition of the above rule.

Fourth, as for the index of gender, I propose to use “Gender Empowerment Index (=GEI)” rather than “Gender-related Development Index,” which DeMartino adopts. “Gender Empowerment Index” shows to what degree women are actively working in a society, while “Gender-related Development Index” shows to what degree women enjoy welfare, life expectancy, and educational attainment in comparison with men in a certain society. These two indexes do not necessarily go parallel. For example, Japanese women rank very high in Gender Development Index, but they rank low in Gender Empowerment Index. I think it would be better to focus more on the substantive empowerment of women rather than their educational attainment.

Fifth, in DeMartino’s system, some countries might encourage rich people to emigrate or to get another citizenship in order to improve their index of equality in income. Some countries might deprive the citizenship from rich people and welcome multinational companies in order to attain a high rate of economic growth and to improve the index of equality of income at the same time. Moreover, some countries such as North Korea might aim at a high level of equality of income without paying much attention to the realization of various human capabilities. These strategies are morally hazardous. It seems to be a failure of domestic governance in the light of human capabilities.

In order to avoid this kind of moral hazards and pay more attention to human capabilities, some considerations are required as for the index of “Income Equality Coefficient.” DeMartino uses this index with a special focus on “lower 40% in income” but he seems not to be able to treat the people in poverty adequately. Not all of lower 40% in income are the poorest. In order to focus on the “welfare improvement of the poorest people,” we had better pay more attention to the gap between, say, “lower 10% and middle 10% in income” in the treatment of “Income Equality Coefficient.” This gap would show us how poor the lower 10% in income with comparison to the standard living of middle class people. When the data of the income are not easily available, we may replace it to the index of “Human Poverty.” This index is sophisticated since it makes a difference between advanced countries and developing countries. The standard of poverty in advanced countries has more severe criteria. Thus by using this index, we could effectively focus on the problem of poverty both in advanced and developing countries.

Sixth, we might also need to take the matter of immigration and refugee into account. When nations accept immigrants and refugees, the values of such as equality of income or educational attainment would be partly sacrificed. If the index such as “Income Equality Coefficient” or “Human Development Index” were important for setting tariffs in international trade, nations would not have accepted immigrants and refugees at the cost of their governance. Therefore, in order to eliminate the handicap from nations with a large number of immigrants and refugees, we need to add an index of immigrants and refugees to the DeMartino’s proposal.

Seventh, the index of DeMartino’s proposal does not include the idea of social

democracy: it does not pay attention to the degree of democratization nor the Labor Standards Law (for example, the law on children's labor). As a consequence, DeMartino put Belarus, a country in Eastern Europe, in the first rank, though it adopts autocratic governance. I think it's better to take the issue of democracy into account for global justice in making the index of tariff rates. We also take it into account that those autocratic nations such as Angola, Myanmar, Congo, or Sudan are in conflict partly due to the close relationship between the government and the multinational corporations. We need to give strong incentives to these countries for democratization by controlling the rate of tariffs.

Last, we may also make use of the data of "the number of Internet host per capita" in order to measure a degree of democratization. Since Internet enables us to access various information without much cost, this tool seems to bring us substantive knowledge conditions for democracy. The use of the Internet is also worthwhile to a informational condition for developing capabilities.

A Modified Version of DeMartino's Proposal

So far we examined DeMartino's proposal in detail and pointed that there are some theoretical or practical problems. In order to overcome those difficulties and make a development, I shall propose a largely modified version of DeMartino's tariff system, which I call "Index of Spontaneizationism for Tariff Structure."

My index is composed of the following six indexes: human development, democratization, elimination of human poverty, gender empowerment, the number of accepted refugees, and development of the capability for adults. More clearly, this is calculated from the following equation (see also figure 2):

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Index of Human Development} + \text{Index of Democracy} + (-) \text{Index of Human Poverty} \\ & + \text{Index of Gender Empowerment} + \text{Index of the number of accepted refugees} + \\ & \text{Index of the number of Internet Users} \end{aligned}$$

Those four indexes – Index of Human Development, Human Poverty, Index of Gender Empowerment, and the number of accepted refugees – are available from United Nations Human Development Report. Index of Democracy is available in Freedom House (see its home page, 2006 version). Index of the number of Internet Users is from Report of World Development (see its home page).

In order to sum up those indexes adequately, we converted each index into the index whose data distribution is from 1 to 0. The exact equation is the following:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Index of Human Development} + (1 - ((\text{score of political right} + \text{score of civil} \\ & \text{freedom} - 2) * 5/60) + (1 - (\text{Human Poverty} [\text{advanced country version} / \text{developing} \\ & \text{country version}] / 100)) + \text{Index of Gender Empowerment} + ((\text{Accepted refugee} - \end{aligned}$$

Left Refugee) / 300) + (The number of people with Internet access per 1,000)

This is the simplest way to sum up the data of six indexes. I also tried various way of summing up those indexes with additional weight on data but the rankings of nations has not changed so much especially in top ranked nations.

Technically, four things are operated: I calculate the number of refugee both accepted and left as 0.3 million when they are more than 0.3 million. As for those countries that have no data on Human Poverty, I put the data 30% for advanced countries and 65% for developing countries in order not to give these countries advantage. As for the number of Internet access, I picked up the maxim number of data from 2000 to 2003 and put zero for those countries whose data are not available. I also put zero for those countries that have no data on the index of Gender Empowerment.

My proposal (the index of spontaneizationism for tariff structure) would be better than DeMartino's, because each nation would have better incentives to reform their domestic conditions such as equality of income, gender empowerment, educational attainment and so forth. In DeMartino's proposal, there need be a central authority of tariff system and it has a power to decide the rate of tariffs for every nation. Whereas in my proposal, each nation has a power to decide the rate of tariff under the following rule of tariff system: when country A put x % tariff for imported goods from country B, A needs to put more than x % tariff for imported goods from country C when C's value of "Index of spontaneizationism" is lower than that of country B.

Under this rule on tariffs, nations can pursuit both the idea of "justice of exchange" in international trade and the idea of "achieving various capabilities for all people in the world." Countries are also able to pursuit both the idea of "sovereign power of nation state" and the idea of "global justice in trans-national framework."

Practical Implications

However, my proposal presented here is not the ultimate one. We need to keep examining the composition of the index and might also take the issue of global environment into account. Although my proposal would not be pragmatically feasible but would be politically and ethically significant as a heuristic idea for us to do practice on behalf of global justice in everyday life.

Let us think about the following example. In the ranking of my index, Thailand ranks higher than Philippines (3.27585333 in Thailand and 2.831706667 in Philippines). When Korean or Japanese people buy banana from those two countries, there would be two practical implications. First, Korean or Japanese people raise a political voice to their government to put a higher rate of tariff to Philippines than to Thailand as to banana. Second, Korean or Japanese people, as consumers, can buy banana from Thailand rather than Philippines. In doing so, people can motivate these

nations to improve their capability conditions in order to decrease the rate of tariff and to earn more profit from international trade. In other words, we as consumers can send a political signal to these nations to promote the capability conditions by buying more goods from higher ranked countries in the index. When people try to buy goods from high ranked societies, nations would be motivated to increase their rankings. Thus my index would be pragmatically effective in consumers' movement.

However, there might be a worry about the consequence of my proposal. When people buy banana from Thailand rather than Philippines, then Thailand might become rich while Philippines might remain poor. Generally speaking, if we buy goods from higher ranked countries in my index, those countries would become richer, whereas lower ranked countries would become poorer.

This consequence might happen. However, you might not be afraid of this very much. In reality, not all of us would buy banana from Thailand even because the price of the banana from Philippines is cheaper than the price of banana from Thailand. Think also about the following case: suppose that the banana from Philippines is, say, 1000 won (or 100 yen) and the banana from Thailand is, say, 1100 won (or 110 yen) on average. Then following my index, Korean or Japanese government would be required to put a relatively higher rate of tariff to the banana from Philippines than the banana from Thailand: for example, Korean or Japanese government put 10% tariff for banana from Philippines and 3% tariff for banana from Thailand. In this condition of charged tariff, the price of banana from Philippines would be 1100 won (or 110 yen), while the price of banana from Thailand would be 1133 won (or 113 yen). However, the price of banana from Philippine is still cheaper than that from Thailand, and therefore many people would still buy banana from Philippines. Some people might buy banana from Thailand since the price is not so different from that from Philippines.

Generally, consumer's behavior depends on the relative price difference. Thus the consequence of my proposal would depend on the relative rate of tariffs. We cannot conclude that higher ranked countries would become richer, whereas low ranked countries would become poorer, under my proposal of tariff system without reference to the rate of tariffs.

Figure 2: Index of Spontaneizationism for Tariff Structure

United States	5.13438	Grenada	2.222706667
Germany	5.11255	Qatar	2.22029
United Kingdom	4.853433333	Sri Lanka	2.21274
Sweden	4.682403333	Zambia	2.192756667
Netherlands	4.66695	Egypt	2.189996667
Canada	4.599163333	Ghana	2.18684
Denmark	4.458153333	Nicaragua	2.183623333

Australia	4.406326667	Jordan	2.169716667
Norway	4.319983333	Georgia	2.16876
Iceland	4.31274	Moldova, Rep. of	2.141516667
Finland	4.262486667	Bahrain	2.138443333
Switzerland	4.149706667	Lebanon	2.123463333
Belgium	4.077973333	Antigua and Barbuda	2.108543333
New Zealand	3.94829	Turkey	2.076183333
Austria	3.930363333	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	2.052526667
Barbados	3.81878	Myanmar	2.036196667
Spain	3.81611	Ukraine	1.998416667
Japan	3.766023333	Seychelles	1.977846667
Costa Rica	3.705766667	Samoa (Western)	1.964983333
France	3.626276667	Guatemala	1.94734
Ireland	3.61667	Oman	1.89092
Korea, Rep. of	3.606366667	Sao Tome and Principe	1.886013333
Italy	3.60066	Maldives	1.88238
Estonia	3.588786667	Tunisia	1.8737
Slovenia	3.586083333	Bangladesh	1.845466667
Chile	3.557313333	Kuwait	1.84223
Latvia	3.53559	Senegal	1.831053333
Israel	3.465066667	Papua New Guinea	1.82173
Czech Republic	3.460343333	Madagascar	1.816976667
Portugal	3.45351	Benin	1.80696
Uruguay	3.42701	Nepal	1.80245
Singapore	3.423436667	Lesotho	1.78069
Slovakia	3.398536667	Albania	1.773093333
Lithuania	3.361233333	Congo	1.75529
Poland	3.359116667	Yemen	1.743153333
Malta	3.35603	Comoros	1.74126
Hungary	3.335573333	Morocco	1.7392
Greece	3.282656667	Cuba	1.72968
Mexico	3.278126667	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1.708263333
Thailand	3.275853333	Tonga	1.68923
Panama	3.27162	Guinea	1.67116
"Hong Kong, China (SAR)"	3.261103333	Cambodia	1.671146667
Bulgaria	3.23784	Swaziland	1.65686
Trinidad and Tobago	3.21903	United Arab Emirates	1.640446667
Luxembourg	3.217853333	Djibouti	1.62973
Tanzania, U. Rep. of	3.188413333	Solomon Islands	1.615906667

Bahamas	3.1659	Russian Federation	1.605073333
Cyprus	3.14911	Mali	1.599016667
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	3.127036667	Syrian Arab Republic	1.531516667
Belize	3.10085	Timor-Leste	1.529666667
Dominican Republic	3.055323333	Nigeria	1.52108
Malaysia	3.05309	Kyrgyzstan	1.517076667
Peru	2.990263333	Guinea-Bissau	1.487506667
Ecuador	2.872293333	Malawi	1.48343
El Salvador	2.84441	Cameroon	1.482123333
Philippines	2.831706667	Mozambique	1.474103333
Namibia	2.830446667	Gambia	1.468876667
Argentina	2.83002	Brunei Darussalam	1.466
Saudi Arabia	2.829216667	Togo	1.412333333
Colombia	2.80354	Kazakhstan	1.40666
Pakistan	2.79528	Occupied Palestinian Territories	1.404
Bolivia	2.77537	Gabon	1.39118
Paraguay	2.774896667	Ethiopia	1.371746667
Mongolia	2.773443333	Equatorial Guinea	1.35555
Saint Lucia	2.74058	Belarus	1.33698
Mauritius	2.716516667	Central African Republic	1.32845
Venezuela	2.681966667	Cote d'Ivoire	1.322096667
India	2.643156667	Chad	1.318243333
Romania	2.627383333	Mauritania	1.30636
Brazil	2.614573333	Niger	1.301613333
Jamaica	2.61145	Sierra Leone	1.30062
Kenya	2.5827	Lao People's Dem. Rep.	1.21414
Cape Verde	2.5776	Rwanda	1.199393333
Fiji	2.5666	Zimbabwe	1.192313333
Honduras	2.542503333	Uzbekistan	1.189876667
Suriname	2.523053333	Burkina Faso	1.175586667
Botswana	2.464213333	Haiti	1.169686667
Croatia	2.45182	Turkmenistan	1.132983333
South Africa	2.423866667	Tajikistan	1.065963333
Guyana	2.380876667	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.82221
Macedonia, TFYR	2.373366667	Bhutan	0.809763333
China	2.33525	Eritrea	0.747563333
Armenia	2.31583	Viet Nam	0.701676667
Algeria	2.298313333	Azerbaijan	0.522516667
Dominica	2.29326	Burundi	0.47097
Vanuatu	2.281443333	Congo, Dem. Rep. of the	0.407726667

Indonesia	2.263236667	Angola	0.28294
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2.24387	Sudan	0.19701
Uganda	2.22288		

* This paper is translated from my book titled *Conditions of Empire* (Teikoku no Jouken in Japanese, Koubundo, 2007.4.), chapter 10, section 3-2. (Notes are eliminated or incorporated in the text.)