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How can we facilitate the reconciliation and dialogue in East Asia?

PROGRAM			
<b>DATE</b>	SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 2019		
<b>VENUE</b>	Bldg 16, Room 548, Seoul National University		
<b>TIME TABLE</b>	10:00–10:20	Registration & Opening Address	
	<b>SESSION 1</b>		
	Chair: Kim Hong–Jung (SNU)		
	10:20–11:10	Han Sang–Jin (SNU)	How to Assess the Populist Challenges Today?
	11:10–12:00	Sakurai Yoshihide (HU)	Religion and Modernity in East Asia: For understanding historic arche and legitimization in postcolonial times
	12:00–13:30	LUNCH BREAK	
	<b>SESSION 2</b>		
	Chair: Sakurai Yoshihide (HU)		
	13:30–14:20	Hashimoto Tsutomu (HU)	The Nature of Unintended Consequence in Max Weber’s thesis on Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
	14:20–15:10	Kang Jaeho (SNU)	Whither transnationality? Some theoretical questions in Asian cultural studies
	15:10–15:30	BREAK	
	<b>SESSION 3</b>		
	Chair: Han Sang–Jin (SNU)		
15:30–16:20	Kim Changjin (HU)	The mutual understanding and cooperation of Social Common Problems facing Korea and Japan: A Study on the Current Situation, Countermeasures and Implications of Low Birthrate and Aging Society in Korea and Japan	
16:20–17:10	Kim Hong–Jung, Kim Yuha, Kim Jung Hwan, Ryu Yeunmee (SNU)	Bar Examination as an Assemblage of Desire for Korean Youth: Focusing on the journal <考試界>	
17:10–17:30	Overall Discussion		

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# Genealogical Traces of Populism and Multiple Typologies of Populist Orientation in South Korea

## *An Empirical Analysis*

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### Abstract

This paper is aimed at two goals. The first is to outline major genealogical traces of populism in South Korea. The second is to develop multiple typologies of populist citizens. The first is speculative and comprehensive, while the latter is analytic and empirical. The major findings of the empirical analysis show significant attitudinal differences 1) between two groups of citizens: populist and conventionalist; 2) between two groups within populism, that is, power-oriented and public-oriented populist citizens; 3) between the neo-liberal populist and the welfare populist; and finally, 4) between the candlelight populist and the national flag populist. It is also found 5) that the multiple typologies of populist orientations are closely interrelated to merge into two distinct streams: one is conservative and the other is progressive. These findings yield many political implications that require further research and reflection.

### Keywords

genealogical traces – South Korea – power-oriented populism – welfare-oriented populism – candlelight populism – national flag populism

## 1 Introduction

Most of the research on populism today follows a top-down approach and is centered on the role of either the political party or leader.<sup>1</sup> Which party can be identified as populist, to begin with? Who are the populist leaders on whom we should focus attention? Which policies can be defined as populist and why? Who are the supporters of a populist party and what are they socially composed of? Is there any populist ideology, and if so, what are its main messages? All these questions are discussed from the perspective of the political party or leader. Citizens are considered only as a voter responding to the drives set in motion from above. Slight attention is paid to the dynamic role of citizens as an actor or agency of historical transformation. Though populism challenges the traditional paradigm of party politics and elite leadership, research on populism is not challenging at all, because it continues to rely on a party-oriented, elite-centered approach.

This paper departs from this conventional approach and draws attention to the dynamic role of citizens.<sup>2</sup> When we study populism, we start by asking who the populist citizens are, by which criteria we define them so, and what these citizens are composed of in terms of their political outlooks. We also ask how these groups are related to and distinguished from others. We also want to explain why they see the world in the way they do, not the other way around, fully considering their own experience and interpretation. This presupposes multiple pathways to the formation of populist citizens and orientations and requires an empirical analysis. In short, this paper is aimed at investigating populism from the points of view of citizens, not from the political party or elites.

Nevertheless, the concept of populism is highly contested. The way it is used, not only in politics and media but also in social sciences, tends to be fuzzy

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1 This is a revision of a paper originally presented at a special seminar on populism and democracy held at Seoul National University, Korea on May 31, 2018.

2 The author has taken this approach in the following works. "Comparative Study of Neighborhood Community Reconstruction in Seoul, Beijing: An Action-Theoretical Approach." co-authored with Young-Hee Shim, and Jung-su Kim. *Korea Journal* 58(2) Summer (2018), 113–140; "Global Risks and Cosmopolitan Citizens in East Asia: A Look at the Fukushima Disaster and Nuclear Power Plant." *Development and Society* 46(2) (2017), 195–225; "Citizens' Movement in South Korea and Reflexive Modernization." In *Reimagining Social Movements from Collectives to Individuals*, eds. Antimo L. Farro, and Henri Lustiger-Thaler (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 143–158; "Middle-Class Grassroots Identity and Participation in Citizen Initiatives, China and South Korea." In *China's Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation*, ed. Cheng Li. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 264–287.

and slippery. This is perhaps because all modern types of politics inherently involve aspects of populism, as an appeal to the people as a normative foundation of power. The volatility and intensity of populism may vary depending on many factors. According to a report based on the electoral results of 102 populist parties in 39 European countries between 2000 and 2017, populism can take root “anywhere on the political spectrum, including both the far right and the far left.”<sup>3</sup> No intrinsic common goal can be confirmed. More often than not, it looks conservative, but it can also be progressive. Peasant populism, working class populism or urban consumer populism is equally conceivable. It can take a left-wing ideology as well as a right-wing one. It may promote democracy, yet it can also pose a threat to it. With these fluidities and heterogeneities, populism escapes from systematic comprehension.

Furthermore, we are now living in an age of global risks and digitalized communication. The combined effects of these trends are tremendous. Triggered by increasing economic inequality,<sup>4</sup> the ghost of populism is spreading in the world. And populism is becoming ever more emotional, deeply affected by the frequent use of digital devices. Anti-populism has also gained momentum. Caught somewhere in between, we find that it is not easy to keep a balance. Indeed, the dangers of an exclusionary populism are beyond doubt. Yet we need to pay careful attention to various aspects of populism. It is not desirable to use the label of populism to demonize political opponents.

Korea is no exception. The governments of Lee Myung-bak (2008–13) and Park Geun-hye (2013–17), for instance, defined a distinctive feature of Korean democracy—a close link between institutional (party) politics and social movements—as a dangerous manifestation of populism. The conservative media have attacked Korean President Moon Jae-in (2017–) as a welfare populist, meaning that his government increases welfare expenses too rapidly with no solid master plan. Meanwhile, the candlelight vigils and national flag marches, as two opposite types of populism, demonstrated themselves on a massive scale in Seoul from 2016 to 2018. These movements were by no means new. They originated from different genealogical traces of populism. What is

3 Martin Eiermann, Yascha Mounk, and Limor Gultchin. *European Populism: Trends, Threats and Future Prospects* (Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2017). According to them, “right-wing populist parties are much more influential than left-wing populists” in Europe. They count 74 out of 102 parties as right populists. Only 24 parties stood for election in 2000, but their number increased to 46 in 2017. Right populists are strongest in Eastern Europe, while left populists are so in Southern Europe. In 2000, an average 8.5% of the vote went to populist parties, but the figure increased to 24.1% in 2017.

4 Sang-Jin Han, and Young-Hee Shim, “The Global Economic Crisis, Dual Polarization, and Liberal Democracy in South Korea.” *Historical Social Research* 43(4) (2018), 274–299.

new is that they occurred during the same time and confronted each other in the streets of downtown Seoul intensively and passionately, at least for several months, but in a remarkably peaceful way.<sup>5</sup> Thus, we ask what these experiences mean for populism in Korea. Both movements share the characteristics of populism, though their political goals diverge sharply. It makes no sense to define only one of these as populist. This urges an historical analysis of the genealogical traces of populism. This also asks what types of populism are coming back from the past and working in society today.

Thus, this paper attempts a case study of Korea with a focus on civil society rather than party politics.<sup>6</sup> One of its main tasks is to develop multiple typologies of populist citizens and orientations and examine their interrelations and contrasting attitudes concerning some salient issues related to populism. In order to do so, however, we should have the minimum criterion by which we can sort out the instances of populism. I suggest two. The first concerns the push factor of populism, that is, the existence of an explicit and consistent distrust of professional politicians. Populism juxtaposes the corrupt elites and the conscientious people, while projecting itself to represent the latter's homogenizing and unified voice.<sup>7</sup> Such a criterion is important because it explains why ordinary people become angry and frustrated when they see the political elites preoccupied with their own interests at a systematic cost to the people.

The second criterion is related to the pull factor of populism, that is, the conception of the people as the originator and foundation of popular sovereignty. The people are referred to the only apparent consensual basis of a democratic politics. In fact, the concept of the people is an invention. The people, as an indeterminate collectivity, do not function independent of its being imaginatively constructed. In this sense, we can say: "Populism is a performative operation by which the people are named and acted upon." Upon this discursive

5 "How could hundreds of thousands of South Korean protesters take to the streets in the capital [...] without one or more flashpoints igniting?" Changrok Soh, Youngsoo Yu, and Daniel Connolly asked this question in their paper, "Flashpoints That Do Not Ignite—Nonviolence and the 2016–2017 South Korean Impeachment Protests." *Korea Observer* 49(3) (2018), 374–75.

6 The relationship between politics and civil society in Korea calls for careful attention. Korean politics is characterized by a two-party system; one is conservative and the other is more or less progressive. Needless to say, the monopoly of political power by these two grand parties has produced some side effects. Yet, since 1987, free elections have produced peaceful transitions of power from the ruling to the opposition party. While doing so, the two parties have incorporated salient inputs from society. There is found a delicate balance between an active civil society with various populist value orientations and the steering role of this two-party system.

7 Thomas Greven. *The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Perspective* (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2016).

condition, democratic politics could be understood as “an expression of the *volonté générale* [general will] of the people.”<sup>8</sup> This criterion is important because it enables us to see not simply the negative role of distrust, but the positive pulling energy of popular representation and participation and hence the demand for democracy.

## 2 Historical Overview of Populist Trajectories

The starting point of our preliminary study of the genealogical traces of populism in the modern history of Korea is the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century when the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910) faced systemic crises. For many reasons, popular perceptions of catastrophe spread widely at that time together with many forms of social unrest, spiritual awakening, native religions, peasant uprisings and other types of protest.<sup>9</sup> In particular, native religions preaching the downfall of history and the coming new world were very influential among the peasant mass. One of the essential characteristics of peasant populism was the strong distrust of the ruling elites and foreign influences. It deeply lamented that all the suffering, pain, and anxiety accumulated on the shoulders of the common people. The pulling energy of the common people lied in the self-awakening of their role. They imagined themselves as the principal actor moving forward to a new world.

*Donghak* (Eastern Learning), an influential native religion, emphatically advocated human dignity and equality based on its philosophy that man and God are one being. As such, it opposed the corrupt feudal system of exploitation and increasing foreign influences. As it spread widely, its political dynamism generated nationwide waves of peasant revolution (1894) which swept over the southwestern regions and took over local governments. *Donghak* peasant populism demanded a number of system reforms including dismantling the hereditary privileged noble (ruling) class and the mechanisms of exploitation built into these systems. This populism was mercilessly cracked down on, however, by Japanese military forces equipped with modern arms, which came to

8 Ernesto Laclau. *La razón populista* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006).

C. Mudde. “The populist Zeitgeist.” *Government & Opposition* 39(4) (2004), 541–563.

9 Gi-Wook Shin. *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford University Press, 2006).

Sunyoung Park. “Anarchism and Culture in Colonial Korea: Minjung Revolution, Mutual Aid, and the Appeal of Nature.” *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 28 (2018), 93–115.

Korea upon the request of the Joseon dynasty. Though it failed, this movement left a profound populist legacy that still works strongly.

The second point is nationalist populism as a collective response to Japanese colonial rule in Korea (1910–45). The goal of this movement was “to recover the nation’s sovereignty from Japan and to establish a liberated nation-state.” The populist nationalism culminated in the March 1st independent movement in 1919, which lasted for several months with several million participants. Japanese rule and its ruling elites became the major target of populist resistance. Shin Chae-ho (1880–1936)<sup>10</sup> declared: “In order to maintain the life of the Joseon nation, one must get rid of the Japanese, the robbers. In order to get rid of the Japanese, revolution is the only answer ... [and] the first step of our revolution is to call for the awakening of the people (*minjung*).” For him, the best way to avoid the danger of losing national identity was “to awaken the minds and hearts of the people.” In this way, the Korean people as the foundation of a new state and Japan as aggressor became firmly rooted. The populist nationalism proved to be extraordinarily strong: among the Asian countries Japan ruled over, it faced the strongest and most fearful resistance from Korea. Here we can find genealogical traces from peasant populism to nationalist populism through the collective memories of colonial rule. Nationalist populism nurtured a strong desire for an independent nation state. Consequently, power-oriented populism is still very pervasive in Korea.

Third, followed by this was the tragedy of the Korean War (1950–53), which was completely destructive. Most of the modern facilities in South and North Korea were burned into ashes, with several million casualties. While the battlefields quickly moved deep into the south and then back to the north up to the borderline with China, the destruction, pains and sacrifices reached beyond imagination, with nothing for South and North Korea to gain. Populism became deeply penetrated and conquered by the emotions of resentment and hostility. The red regime in the north became fully demonized in the south as the United States was so in the north. In the south, the anti-communist (anti-red) hatred emotion became so widely institutionalized in social institutions and so deeply penetrated into subjectivity that if one is stigmatized as “red,” he or she may find no future. In South Korea, this collective experience has given rise to a particularly powerful binary opposition between the United States as friend and a radical protest movement as leaning toward pro-North Korea,

10 Chae-ho Shin. “Choson Hyongmyong Sonon” [Declaration of Korean Revolution]. *Hanguk Minjungnon* [Korean Minjung], The Korean Institute of Theology, (1984), 407.



identified as evil and perilous.<sup>11</sup> This genealogical trace represents a disjunction in the genealogical traces of populism in Korea, and this disjunction has been built into the global structure of the Cold War.

Fourth, perhaps, in a way reconstituting the older trajectories of populist imagination, a new populist movement emerged during the 1980s when Korea went through the process of political democratization. The main actors at this stage were college students and progressive young intellectuals who led this change. As the renowned historian Ki-baik Yi<sup>12</sup> noted, “the role of radical activists [...] has been distinct in two senses: in their role as the vanguard of mass mobilization; and as the advocates of national ideology. In both respects the *minjung* idea has been crucial.” In the past, the conservative forces gained much benefit from the ideological position they occupied in the background of the division of the nation. During the 1980s, however, the college students attempted to reactivate the tradition of the grassroots popular movement.<sup>13</sup> A good example was the *minjung* culture on college campuses during the 1980s. Against the conservative mainstreams of history and politics, they initiated a number of experiments in the arts, dancing, and singing, while attempting to read Korean history from the perspective of *minjung*.

These populist movements showed considerable pluralities and diversities in the repertoires of imagination and action. Progressive Christian intellectuals proclaimed a *minjung* theology and defended the rights of poor people in the name of gospel. Many college students volunteered to teach night classes in urban shantytowns to help the children of poor families. Many even gave up college education to get into factories as camouflaged workers. They volunteered to learn how to live together with the laborers and how to help them organize labor unions. These populist cultures became widely expanded from universities into various sectors of Korea including churches, factories, urban shantytowns, and rural areas. *Minjung* populism expressed the dream

11 Wooyeol Shin. “Conservative Journalists’ Myth Making in South Korea: Use of the Past in News Coverage of the 2008 Korean Candlelight Vigil.” *Asian Studies Review* 40(1) (2016), 129.

12 Ki-baik Yi. *Han’guksa Sillon: Sinsu-p’an* [A New Theory of Korean History: New Revision] (Ilchokak, 1990)

13 There were a lot of debates among the student movement leaders concerning how to develop a theory of *minjung* as a radical theory of social transformation. They divided into several ideological camps and advocated contrasting views on the issues of the main contradictions of Korean society, the main actors for change, and the strategies to be taken. But they all shared a great hostility toward the military dictatorship in Korea. They also protested against the United States, which supported the dictatorial regime. They also shared the normative view of “*minjung*” as the suppressed yet only legitimate foundation of a new democratic nation they wanted to build.

of a community where people can live peacefully together rather than being separated by hostility and conflicts.<sup>14</sup> Along this line, it attacked the increasing concentration of national wealth in the hands of a small minority of conglomerates.

Finally, we come to the digital age of populist orientation and movements in the 21st century. What is distinctive at this stage is the increasing digitalization of politics in general and populist mobilization in particular. As the majority of Korean citizens use the most advanced digital technologies such as smartphones and SNS, politics has become less and less deliberative and more and more emotional. Populism has become “an affective performance.”<sup>15</sup> As ordinary people create their own blogs, the populist can find like-minded people with lower transaction costs.<sup>16</sup> There have been considerable debates over the consequences of digitalizing the public sphere and the emotional turn of politics.<sup>17</sup> But it is clear that the multiple types of populism compete with each other within a new space of digital communication. This will be shown later with respect to candlelight vigil and national flag populism.

Figure 1 shows an exploratory map of the genealogical traces of populism based on the descriptions above. It shows not a linear evolution, but the multiple traces of populism. It also reveals a rupture in the history of populism. We can find certain overlapping tendencies and the existence of different temporalities of populism in Korea. Starting from this background, we may try to develop a few logically consistent types of populism at the level of civil society and pursue an empirical study to examine how they are related to each other. A careful investigation may help us understand how the different temporalities of populism rooted in history are coming back from the past and working in Korean society today.

14 Paul Chang. “Carrying the Torch in the Darkest Hours: The Socio-Political Origins of Minjung Protestant Movements.” In *Christianity in Korea*, eds. Robert Buswell Jr., and Timothy Lee (University of Hawai’ Press, 2006), 195–220.

15 Manuel Arias Maldonado. “Rethinking Populism in the Digital Age: Social Networks, Political Affects and Post-Truth Democracies.” Paper presented at *XIII Congress AECPA* (Santiago de Compostela, Spain), September 20–22, 2017.

16 Youngmi Kim. “Digital Populism in South Korea: Internet Culture and the Trouble with Direct Participation.” *Korea Economic Institute Academic Paper Series* 3(8) (2008).

17 Agnes Rajacic. “Populist Construction of the Past and Future: Emotional Campaigning in Hungary between 2002 and 2006.” *East European Politics and Societies* 21(4) (2007), 639–660.




FIGURE 1 Genealogical Traces of Populism in Korea

TABLE 1 Demographic composition of Citizen Survey Data in 2018

		2018
Sex	Male	49.1
	Female	50.9
Age	20s	18.6
	30s	18.7
	40s	19.6
	50s	18.8
	60s and over	24.3
Education	High school or below	20.4
	College graduate	66.8
	Post-graduate	12.7
Stratification	Middle strata	62.8
	Low Strata	37.2
Ideology	Conservative	28.7
	Moderate	29.3
	Progressive	42.0
Total		100 (N=1123)

### 3 Survey Data and Two Conceptual Models

We now turn to an empirical case study of populism in Korea. The key analytic task is to develop the multiple types of populism and investigate their relations based on the survey data collected from Seoul citizens in 2018.

Two ways of empirical study can be considered. The first is to define populist citizens by the two criteria suggested above. The second is to define populist citizens in relation to populist movements. I will explain the first and then move to the second.

Concerning the first attitudinal approach, this study follows the Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study 2015, which included a battery of questionnaires targeted to measure the populist attitudes of citizens.<sup>18</sup> As stated above, the minimum criteria of populism are two: one is distrust of professional politicians and the other is the advocacy of the people as the sovereign subject of political participation and legitimation. We selected four out of the eight items that the Hellenic group used in questionnaires in 2015.

- 1) Most politicians do not care about the people
- 2) Most politicians are trustworthy
- 3) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions
- 4) Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful

We asked the respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement by choosing one of the suggested scaled options “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.” The factor analysis of the four items resulted in a component matrix that shows a populist attitude scale (*Cronbach's alpha* = 0.65) with factor loading: 0.756, 0.627, 0.667, and 0.731 for the items above in order. Based on this, we measured the extent of citizens' populist orientation on a cumulative scale from 0 to 12 and sorted out the category of populist citizens (52.9%) and that of conventional citizens (47.1%) by the dividing point 9 (mean 9.478).

More specifically, we formulated four typologies of populism by crossing the populist-conventionalist division with another division of bureaucracy (*guan*) and public (*gong*). The second division has deep roots in the history of

18 Ioannis Andreadis, Jennis Stavrakakis, and G. Katsambekis. “Using surveys to Measure the Populist attitudes of political elites and voters: a Greek pilot study of Supply and Demand.” Paper presented at *The Team Populism Conference ‘Solving the Puzzles of Populism’*: London, April 30–May 2, 2015.

I. Andreadis, and J. Stavrakakis. “European Populist Parties in Government: How well are the Voters Resented? Evidence from Greece.” *Swiss Political Science Review* 23(4) (2017), 485–508.

East Asia, particularly in Korea.<sup>19</sup> Of these, the first *guan* refers to state power, which is exercised in the form of bureaucracy, and the second refers to the public sphere of discourse or public opinion. The status of *Gong* has something to do with the Confucian tradition. The realms of *guan* and *gong* usually work as if closely related, and even overlap, at least partly. But a rupture may occur if the behaviors of the political elite severely deviate from popular normative expectations. Then, a protest movement occurs, defending public interest. One of the best recent examples is a candlelight vigil in 2008. This vigil was initially sparked by the government decision to reopen the Korean market to U.S. beef, which had been banned since 2003 due to cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease) or Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD). A severe clash followed between the mainstream camp, which supported the FTA agreement with the United States by reimporting American beef, and the popular citizen camp, which wanted to defend the right to public health. According to Amnesty International (2008:4), about one million citizens participated in candlelight vigils from May to July 2008.

In this situation, we decided to measure the attitude of citizens in terms of state interests versus public interests by asking the following question.

In 2008, we faced a dilemma concerning the so-called mad cow disease. At that time, some argued that we should reimport American beef to facilitate the free trade agreement with the United States, whereas others were against it to promote people's health. This is only an example. As shown here, if we face a situation of conflict between a state interest like trade diplomacy and public interest like people's health, which position do you feel you are closer to?

The respondents were given choices on a scale from 1 to 9, from the most state-oriented attitude to the most public-oriented attitude. We classified the scale from 1 to 5 as oriented towards state power and from 6 to 9 as oriented towards public interest. We included those on the scale at 5 (middle) in the first category in order to clearly draw out the characteristics of public orientation.

Furthermore, we crossed the populist versus conventionalist axis with another axis of market orientation versus welfare orientation to capture the economic

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19 Sang-Jin Han. "The Public Sphere and Democracy in Korea: A Debate on Civil Society." In *Korean Politics: Striving for Democracy and Unification*, ed. Korean National Commission for UNESCO (Seoul: Hollym, 2002), 255–282.

TABLE 2 Four Political Orientations

	State Power	Public interests	Total
Conventional	Power-oriented Conventional Citizens (256, 22.8%)	Public-oriented Conventional citizens (273, 24.3%)	529 (47.1%)
Populist	Power-oriented Populist Citizens (201, 17.9%)	Public-oriented Populist Citizens (393, 35.0%)	594 (52.9%)
Total	457 (40.7%)	666 (59.3%)	1123 (100%)

TABLE 3 Free Market versus Egalitarianism

Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Private ownership of business and industry should be increased					Government ownership of business and industry should be increased				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for					People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

dimension of populist attitudes. With regard to the latter axis, we chose the following three items that are well established in World Value Research.

The respondents were given choices on a scale from 1 to 10 for each item, from the most market-oriented attitude to the most welfare-oriented attitude. Out of the added scale from 3 to 30, we classified scales 3 to 16 as welfare-oriented and the rest as market-oriented. Table 4 shows the outcome of the correlation of the two axes of populism.

TABLE 4 Four Economic Orientations

	Market	Welfare	Total
Conventional	Neo-liberal Conventional Citizens (239, 21.3%)	Conventional Egalitarian Citizens (290, 25.8%)	529 (47.1%)
Populist	Neo-liberal Populist Citizens (279, 24.8%)	Egalitarian Populist Citizens (315, 28.0%)	594 (52.9%)
Total	518 (46.1%)	605 (53.9%)	1123 (100%)

#### 4 Two Populist Movements: Candlelight Versus National Flag

Finally, we sorted out populist citizens in relation to concrete populist movements which took place in Korea from 2016 to 2018. We explored two possibilities. The first is whether the citizens of Seoul participated in either a candlelight vigil or national flag march. The second is concerned with the extent to which they feel sympathetic to each of these, independent of the first issue. We will show soon why we take the second option in our empirical analysis. Before that, however, it is necessary to make a brief overview of these populist movements.

Candlelight vigil populism and national flag populism stood at opposite ends concerning the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye (2013–17) of the Republic of Korea.<sup>20</sup> To trace the development of this turmoil, two non-profit sports foundations, Mir and K-sports, were founded on October 27 and November 13, 2016, respectively. Soon thereupon, major Korean conglomerates gave a large donation of 72 million U.S. dollars to these foundations. The media detected the strange flows. Choi Soon-sil, an old friend of the president, received this large amount of money and controlled these foundations, and the president encouraged the top CEOs of conglomerates to support Choi and the foundations in various subtle ways. Thus, an explosive influence-peddling scandal broke out.

However, as the president denied any charge, critical opinions grew sharper while the media escalated the debunking of the president's hidden entanglements in improper personal networks and the abuse of power. The president

20 Jong-Sook Choi. "Democratic Attitudes of Candlelight Vigil and National Flag Rally Participants and Presidential Election 2016–2017." *KDF Report: Issue & Review on Democracy* (2018).

apologized for the first time on October 25 and secondly on November 4 and finally on November 29, 2016. But each time she failed to stop the scandal from metastasizing because her apologies lagged far behind public expectations, even in the eyes of her conventional supporters.

The first candlelight vigil to demand that the president should step down started in Seoul on October 29, 2016. The first vigil was rather modest in size, with about 12,000 participants (all figures hereafter are based on police estimation), but the participants in the second vigil on November 5 increased to 48,000. The rallies continued every Saturday afternoon in downtown Seoul. The number of participants increased continually, from 260,000 on November 12 to 330,000 on November 26, and 430,000 on December 3. In this way, the candlelight vigils shook Korean politics very deeply. Looking back on the recent past, the vigils began to take place triggered by the death of two schoolgirls in an accident involving a U.S. Army vehicle in 2002. In 2008, six years later, this style of citizens movement had evolved into a large scale, festival-like protest related to mad cow disease, as shown above. The main participants in this new style of populist movement included teenagers, college students, housewives and their children, white-color workers, activists, and the members of online clubs. Most of the participants identified as more or less progressive rather than conservative. The urban scenes of Seoul from 2016 to 2018 were quite different from this background, however, because the candlelight vigils and the national flag marches, as two radically diverging types of populism, competed with each other at the same time and in the same place.

Both movements claimed to represent the people. Since the candlelight vigil has received attention,<sup>21</sup> there is good reason to pay attention to national flag populism.<sup>22</sup> The participants were certainly older, more conservative, and showed greater sensitivity to the threats they felt. The threats from outside included the security risk from North Korea. From the inside, they also felt a loss of human dignity. Many participated voluntarily and actively rather than being mobilized. The participants expressed how they saw the world and tried to justify the national flag marches. From November 19, 2016 to March 10, 2017 when the Constitutional Court finally decided to remove the president from office, national flag populism continually demonstrated its ability to mobilize its supporters, to raise and articulate their demands, and to present itself as a popular voice in confrontation with the candlelight vigils. We can say that the

21 Paul Chang. "Candlelight Protests in South Korea: The Legacies of Authoritarianism and Democratization." *Ewha Journal of Social Science* 34(1) (2018), 5–18.

22 Sung Kyung Kim. "Minds of Division and Ethics of Hospitality: Focusing on 'Tagukki' Rally and NorthKorean Migrants." *Studies of National-Popular Culture* 75 (2017), 195–227.






FIGURE 2 Police Estimates of Participants in the two Movements

national flag marches represent the first voluntary right-wing populism in the contemporary history of Korea.

To look back briefly, the national flag populist movement began modestly on November 19, 2016 in the square of Seoul Station with about 11,000 participants. It began as a self-conscious challenge to the candlelight vigils demanding the impeachment of the president. They wanted to save the president from grave peril. This can clearly be seen by the activity of *Parksamo*, a fan club for the president, which announced the countervailing rallies every Saturday from late November. On December 24, for example, the 53,000 participants in the candlelight vigil clearly outnumbered the 15,000 in the national flag march. However, on January 7, 2017, a larger number of citizens, 37,000, came out to the streets with the national flag, more than the 24,000 citizens who came out for the candlelight vigil.<sup>23</sup> Figure 2 shows the overall trend of participants in these two populist movements until January 7, 2017 based on police estimations.

All evidence suggests that competition was intense in many respects. On December 9, the Korean legislature voted to begin the impeachment process, with 234 yes votes, 56 no votes, two non-voters, and seven invalid votes. Women with baby carriages had been rather uncommon in the national flag marches but began to appear from February 4, 2017. On March 10, 2017, the Constitutional Court gave its verdict to uphold the motion to impeach. A great

<sup>23</sup> Thereafter, the police stopped estimating the size of the participants. According to information from the host organization, the participants in the candlelight vigils increased from 140,000 on January 14 to 350,000 on January 21, to 420,000 on February 4, 800,000 on February 11, and 840,000 on February 18. After that, the participants were estimated to be more than one million from February 25 to March 4, 2017.

number of the president's supporters who gathered with the national flag were deeply shocked by this decision and declared that they would struggle to nullify the impeachment by forming a national headquarters for the people's resistant movement. A very radical and unconstitutional demand was also expressed.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, the two populist movements were opposed to each other with hardly reconcilable political goals. Neither the members of the National Assembly nor the judges of the Constitutional Court could be completely removed from the pressure of these movements. There was worrying about possible violence. In fact, there were clashes between the national flag protesters and the police on March 10, with 33 police wounded and seven protesters taken to a police station. From the beginning to the end, however, the overall scenes on the streets were surprisingly peaceful, showing many aspects of cultural festivals. According to one interpretation, this Korean experience amounted to "an unprecedented civil revolution and a Glorious Revolution in history without throwing a single stone".<sup>25</sup>

This experience offers rich imagination for the study of populism because both movements shared populist orientations with different outlooks. Both expressed great distrust of professional politicians from different perspectives while advocating the sovereign role of the people in saving the nation from danger. In the eyes of the candlelight vigil participants, President Park, the ruling elites around her, and the ruling party were seen as implicated in systematic corruption, irregularities, and scandals, thereby blocking the country from moving forward to more democracy. They justified and upheld the spirit of candlelight vigils as an outcry of the sovereign people to save the country from this deadlock and enforce justice and democratic reform. The national flag marchers also showed an extreme distrust of the candlelight movement as well as the politicians riding on it. To them, these politicians were leaning towards North Korea, destroying the liberal foundation of the nation. They understood themselves as representing the people who had fought against North Korea. They said that they came out to the streets to save the country from the imminent threats posed by the impeachment drive. In this way, they attempted to delegitimize the candlelight vigils. In a way, we can say that the two movements represent two different worlds in Korea, equipped with such ideologies and political goals as being far more diverging than converging.

24 On January 28, 2017, they even demanded that the army should intervene into politics to end the national crisis by declaring martial law.

25 Dong-Hoon Lee. "The Constitutional Meaning of a Candlelight Assembly in Social Media Society—centering on the Right of Network-Access." *Public Law Journal* 18(2) (2017), 4.

TABLE 5 Four Types of Orientation from Candlelight and National Flag Populism

	Sympathetic to Candlelight	Unsympathetic to Candlelight	Total
Sympathetic to National Flag	Dual Populist (140, 12.5%)	National Flag Populist (90, 8.0%)	230 (20.5%)
Unsympathetic to National Flag	Candlelight Populist (712, 63.4%)	Non-Populist (181, 16.1%)	893 (79.5%)
Total	852 (75.9%)	271 (24.1%)	1123 (100%)

We believe that this experience also offers valuable resources of populism on the level of civil society. We first checked how many citizens participated in these movements. The participants in the candlelight vigils turned out to be 33.7 % of the respondents, while those in the national flag marches were only 5.2%. We also checked how deeply they felt sympathetic to them. We measured the extent of sympathy by asking: "Independent of your participation, how sympathetic are you to the claims raised by each of these two movements?" The respondents were given the options "very sympathetic," "relatively sympathetic," "relatively unsympathetic," and "completely unsympathetic." Those sympathetic to the national flag marches comprised 20.5 % of the respondents. Thus, we decided to use this variable. By crossing the two variables, as shown in Table 5, we obtained four groups: candlelight populist, national flag populist, dual populist, and non-populist.

## 5 Social Justice and Populism

The empirical analysis should start by asking whether and how much we can explain some salient issues by the types of populism we have developed. Among many significant issues, only a few will be touched upon in what follows.

The first issue is concerned about the relationship between populism and social justice. To begin with, populist citizens are found to be consistently and significantly less positive than conventional citizens concerning the extent to which various aspects of social justice are realized in Korea. The aspects of social justice included in our survey study are: income and earnings, job/work opportunities, college education opportunities, recruitment of public servants, public medical services, compulsory education, rule of law, the disparity between the capital city and regions, urban-rural disparities, social welfare,




FIGURE 3 Assessment of Social Justice by Two Types of Economic Populism

taxation policies, gender equality, and the rights of minorities Figure 3. The influence of the populist-conventionalist divide turns out to be significant, with a few exceptions such as compulsory education and public medical services in which the differences are marginal. This finding confirms the assumption of the populism study: being populist means being more frustrated about the reality of inequality.

Furthermore, significant differences were also found among the different types of populism. For instance, power-oriented populist citizens are clearly more positive than public-oriented populist citizens concerning their assessment of social justice. This tendency becomes stronger in the case of neo-liberal populist citizens compared with egalitarian populist citizens, as can be seen in Figure 3.

Thus, we can conclude that: 1) the distinction between the populist citizen and the conventional citizen is effective in relation to social justice; 2) the differentiation of the category of populist citizen into power-oriented and public oriented populists also has an explanatory function; 3) the distinction between the neo-liberal populist and the welfare populist also yields significant differences. This means that the political and economic divides within populism are conceptually and empirically useful.

## 6 Security Issues and Populism

The adequacy of the typologies of populist orientation can also be tested with respect to some security issues in Korea. We pay particular attention to the




FIGURE 4 Security and Other Issues by Four Citizen Groups

issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. The first has become one of the most serious global security risks today. The second is also a serious security problem after the Fukushima disaster in 2011. Thus, against this background, we attempted to measure citizens' attitudes by asking the following questions: "Should we develop a nuclear bomb [in South Korea] if North Korea does not give up nuclear weapons?" and "How much do you agree with increasing nuclear power plants in Korea?" The respondents gave a response to each question on a four-point scale. As stated above, we measured the extent of sympathy to the candlelight vigils and national flag marches with the same four-point scale. Figure 4 suggests nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons, candlelight vigil orientation, and national flag march orientation as four dependent variables, and the four citizen groups, that is, power-oriented conventional citizens, power-oriented populist citizens, public-oriented conventional citizens, and public-oriented populist citizens, as four independent variables, and shows how they are related.

The analysis demonstrates the following tendencies. 1) The difference in attitude between the conventional and populist groups is as significant as that between the two populist citizen groups; 2) The power-oriented populist group shows the greatest support for both nuclear bombs and nuclear power plants, whereas the public-oriented populist group shows the lowest support for nuclear power plants and the second lowest for nuclear bombs. In general, populist citizens are more sensitive to security issues than conventional citizens. Yet, public-oriented populist citizens in Korea deserve special attention since they display a more liberal orientation than any other group. 3) The candlelight vigil orientation varies significantly among the four citizen groups. Of particular




FIGURE 5 Security Issues by Candlelight Versus National Flag Populism (mean support out of 100 maximum)

importance is the finding that the power versus public divide is more influential than the populist versus conventional divide in producing candlelight vigil orientation. Public-oriented populist citizens support the candlelight vigil orientation most strongly, whereas power-oriented conventional citizens stand at the opposite end. 4) The tendency is reversed in the case of the national flag orientation, although the gaps among the four groups are not as big as in the case of the candlelight vigil orientation.

Let us show more specifically how attitudes concerning the two security issues of nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons are affected by the candlelight vigil and national flag populist groups. The difference between these two groups is found to be very significant. As Figure 5 demonstrates, concerning nuclear power plants, national flag populist citizens support an increase in these plants with an average of 73.3 points out of a maximum of 100 points, whereas the candlelight vigil citizens show only 31.7 average points of support. In the case of the security issue of nuclear weapons, a similar tendency is found, with an average of 81.5 points of support versus 55.2.

## 7 Internal Relationships Among the Multiple Typologies of Populism

The discussion so far has shown that the typologies of populism and populist orientation that we developed have some explanatory value when tested against the issues of social justice and security risks. The next issue is how the six types of populism we developed are interrelated. Starting from Figure 1, which showed genealogical traces in a disjunction between the trace (3) and (4), we can imagine a kind of double helix that runs into the form of digital populism (candlelight vigil and national flag populism) by way of occasional

TABLE 6 Correlation of two Axes of Populist Orientation

	<b>Power-oriented populist citizens</b>	<b>Public-oriented populist citizens</b>	<b>Neo-liberal populist citizens</b>	<b>Egalitarian populist citizens</b>	<b>Total</b>
Candlelight populist	56.7%	76.3%	57.7%	80.3%	712 (63.4%)
National flag populist	13.9%	4.3%	14.3%	1.6%	90 (8.0%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>201 (17.9%)</b>	<b>393 (35.0%)</b>	<b>279 (24.8%)</b>	<b>315 (28.0%)</b>	<b>1123 (100.0%)</b>

Note: In this Figure, Dual Populist and Non-populist are not included.

intersections. Can we test this idea empirically? One possibility is to look at the correlation among the suggested typologies of populism.

Table 6 shows a close relationship among candlelight populism, public-oriented populism, and egalitarian populism, on the one hand, and a relatively close relationship among national flag populism, power-oriented populism, and neo-liberal populism on the other. More specifically, the percentage of candlelight citizens is 63.4% and that of national flag citizens is 8.0%. The rest belongs to dual populists and non-populists excluded in Table 6.<sup>26</sup> Seen against the figure 63.4%, the percentages of public-oriented populist citizens and egalitarian populist citizens who converge into candlelight populists make up 76.3% and 80.3% respectively, which are much higher than 63.4%. On the other hand, the percentages of power-oriented populist citizens and neo-liberal populist citizens who converge into national flag populists make up 13.9% and 14.3% respectively, which are higher than 8.0% which represents the percentage of national flag populists. If we are permitted to stretch our imagination, this finding implies that the driving energy of the candlelight vigils may have its macro-historical origin in the populist-democratic movement in defense of public interests and welfare. In contrast, the driving energy of national flag orientation may have something to do with the macro-history of power-oriented

<sup>26</sup> Though the two other categories are not included in Table-6, dual orientation stays in-between candlelight and national flag populism. These citizens are more sensitive to the value of community reconstruction than others.

TABLE 7 Composition of Progressive and Conservative Populism and Their Impacts (%)

	Progressive Populism			Conservative Populism		
	Candlelight Populist Citizens	Public- oriented Populist Citizens	Egalitarian Populist Citizens	National Flag Populist	Power- oriented Populist Citizens	Neo- liberal Populist Citizens
Progressive Identity	60.7	58.5	61.8	25.0	49.1	47.9
Support for nuclear weapons	55.2	59.5	59.8	81.5	73.3	69.2
Increase in nuclear power plants	31.7	30.9	28.9	73.3	48.1	45.5
Closer to China than U.S.	39.6	38.3	38.9	25.5	35.0	35.2
Obey the law	49.5	49.3	49.6	64.7	56.7	54.3
Community goes first	51.0	52.3	50.2	58.1	55.7	57.1
State more important than individual	46.6	45.1	45.6	56.7	53.1	50.4
Free expression of conflict	70.3	72.6	70.8	58.7	66.0	69.9

and neo-liberal populism. Not only the populist versus conventionalist divide, but also the power (*guan*) versus public (*gong*) divide wields significant influence on the formation of candlelight or national flag populism. This seems to imply an interesting possibility of the micro-foundation of the macro-history of the genealogical traces of populism.

One step further, our analysis shows attitudinal coherence among candlelight populist citizens, public-oriented populist citizens, and egalitarian populist citizens, on the one hand, and among national flag populist citizens, power-oriented populist citizens, and neo-liberal populist citizens, on the other, with respect to such issues as ideological identification, support for nuclear weapons, increasing nuclear power plants, geopolitical priority between the U.S. and China, rule of law, and other issues related to community, individual, state, and free expression of conflict. Based on this, we can derive two contrasting camps of populism in Korea. One is the conservative camp and the other is the progressive camp.

Table 7 clearly demonstrates sharp differences in ideological orientation between the conservative and progressive camps of populism as well as the six types of populist citizens. Measured by the scale in which the self-recognized maximum progressive attitude is 100, candlelight populist citizens are clearly progressive (average mean 60.7) while national flag populist citizens are very conservative (25.0). The three populist groups (candlelight, public-oriented, and egalitarian populist citizens) share a progressive identity, as shown by their average mean of 60.7, 58.5, and 61.8, whereas the other three populist



groups (national flag, power-oriented, and neo-liberal populist citizens) show 25.0, 49.1, and 47.9 respectively. The differences between the two camps and among the six populist citizen groups are also clear with respect to the two issues of security risks. The three groups of the conservative camp of populism consistently show much higher support in regard to the issues at hand than the three groups of the progressive camp of populism. Similar tendencies can be confirmed in regard to other issues in Table 7, though the differences are not as large as above. There are variations among citizen groups within the two camps. Yet it can be said that the members of the conservative populist camp, when compared with the members of the progressive camp, show far greater support for nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants and for such claims as obeying laws no matter how bad they are, prioritizing community over individual interests, and accepting the authority of the state before individual freedom. Conversely, the latter shows greater support than the former for moving closer to China than the United States, and free expression of conflict.

## 8 Concluding Remarks

There are two points in need of reflection before we conclude. One is the significance of this case study for a transnational comparative study. Another is the implications of this study for the relationship between populism and democracy.

As a case study of populism, this paper has shown how multiple types of populism have been generated, interacted, and distinguished in terms of their attitudes toward some salient issues related to populism. Though this paper is a case study of Korea, the types of populism discussed are neither unique nor particular to Korea. They can be found in other countries as well.<sup>27</sup> The logic underlying public-oriented populism in Korea shows a close affinity to

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27 Most studies dealing with right-wing populism, exclusionary populism, and various national cases of Latin American populism and European populism including Eastern and Southern European countries can be linked by a comparative perspective. A few examples include: Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Kaltwasser. "Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary European and Latin America." *Government and Opposition* 48(2) (2013), 147–174; Thomas Greven, *The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Perspective* (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2016); and Elena Block, and Ralph Negrine. "The Populist Communication Style: Toward a Critical Framework." *International Journal of Communication* 11 (2017), 178–197; Bertjan Verbeek, and Andrej Zaslove. "Italy: A Case of Mutating Populism?" *Democratization* 23(2) (2016), 304–323; Kirk Hawkins, and Chrisobal R. Kaltwasser. "The Ideational Approach to Populism." *Latin American Research Review* 52(4) (2017), 513–528.

the type of inclusionary populism found in Latin American countries. In contrast, the power-oriented populism looks to be closer to Western right-wing exclusionary populism. There seem to be intrinsic similarities between Korea and Southern Europe with respect to welfare populism and between Korea and Turkey with respect to neo-liberal populism.<sup>28</sup> The candlelight vigil populism in Korea can be seen as a left-wing inclusionary populism in the Western sense. Thus, we need to bring a transnational perspective to the multiple typologies of populism to explore the meaning of populism in a logically consistent, historically substantive, and politically imaginative way.

The final reflection is on democracy. Indeed, one of the most controversial issues of populism is centered on the relationship between populism and democracy.<sup>29</sup> Many tend to see in populism an inherent threat to liberal democracy. This claim is not wrong. The issue is whether this is all about the relationship between populism and democracy. For instance, the thesis that populism emerges out of the context of economic crisis, yet cannot be a solution but further aggravates crisis, can perhaps be sustained. Broadly speaking, however, whether populism works positively or negatively in a society depends on the context of development and the issues involved. In Argentina, for instance, the meaning and function of populism was far more positive during the 1930s and 1940s than today. In this regard, South Korea may be one of the most noticeable testing cases in the world because both positive and negative tendencies are rich. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but we can infer from the analysis made which types of populism or populist citizens are more likely to contribute to or threaten democracy. This will be shown in another paper to follow.<sup>30</sup>

28 Uemit Akcay. "Neoliberal Populism in Turkey and its Crisis." *Working Paper* (Institute for International Political Economy Berlin, 2018).

29 William Galston. "The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 29(2) (2018), 5–19.

Roberto Stefan Foa, and Yascha Mounk. "The Signs of Deconsolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 28 January (2017), 5–15. Ronald F. Inglehart. "The Danger of Deconsolidation: How Much Should We Worry?" *Journal of Democracy* 27 July (2016), 18–23.

30 Sang-Jin Han and Young-Hee Shim. "Economic Crisis and Populist Response: A Comparative Look at the Potential Threat to Democracy." Paper presented in *RC 16, International Sociological Association* (Toronto, Canada), July 2018.







## **Religion and Modernity in East Asia: for understanding historic arche and legitimation in postcolonial times**

**21st Century Sociological Imagination and  
Thinking: how can we facilitate the  
reconciliation and dialogue in East Asia?**

**SAKURAI Yoshihide**

**Graduate School of Letters**

**November 23, 2019**

**For mutual understanding between Korea and Japan**

**1**

### **Similarity**

- **Global world economy-oriented**
- **Condition of well-being in compressed modernity and family-based social security regime**
- **Sharing mixed religiosity of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, in addition to ancestral rite and shamanism**

### **Difference**

- **Presidential system and constitutional monarchy**
- **Ratio of Christian population: Korea(30%) vs. Japan(1%)**
- **Historical recognition of colonialism and Treaty between Korea and Japan in 1965**
- **Boycott campaign and uninterested attitude**



**HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY**

## Why are there more mass-movement in Korea than Japan?


### Genealogical Trances of populism in Korea

- Peasant/popular religion in late 19 century
- Nationalism/anti-colonialism in early 20C.
- Nationalism/anti-communism in later 20C.
- Democratic movement in late 20 C.
- Digital/street movement in early 21C.

Han Sang-Jin, 'Genealogical Trances of populism and Multiple Typologies of Populist Orientations in South Korea, Populism 2:29-52, 2019

### Japan

- Semi-democratic/popular religions in late 19C.
- Triumph of colonialism/totalitarianism in early 20 C.
- Democracy by GHQ and allied nations in mid 20 C.
- Anti-political/social regime movement in later 20 C.
- Economic prosperity and mass society/privatization in 21 C.
- **Japan lacks have successful mass movement, therefore...**



## Charles H. Long, scholar of Chicago school of religion

hermeneutics of conquest and colonialism generated during the formation of the social and symbolic order called the "New World," and a critique of the categories of civil religion from the perspective of the black experience and the experience of colonized peoples

### Study religiosity of marginal people

- **Black Christianity**
- **the Babylonian captivity = slave trade in 15-19 centuries**

### historical arche-points:

- **the common experience and related to core of religiosity for those nations**

What is the begging point of Japanese history and its religiosity?

- **Invented at colonial times**
- **Changed at post-colonial times?**



## Considering the relation between Korea and Japan

### 1 populist movement or extremist one?

- No-buy, no-trip to Japan movement in Korea
- Traditional and new hate speeches to Korean residents in Japan

### 2 discrepancy of historical recognition

- forced labors and comfort women
- Asian women foundation in 1990s and court case in 2010s

### My question:

- What is the archetypal recognition of its own history and society in Korea and Japan? What is the root of authoritarianism in Japan?



## The enthronement ceremony of the Emperor Reiwa was held on Dec. 22th



“Having previously succeeded to the imperial throne in accordance with the **Constitution of Japan and the Special Measures Law on the Imperial House Law**, I now ... proclaim my enthronement to those at home and abroad,”

“I pledge hereby that I **shall act according to the Constitution**, and fulfill my responsibility as the **symbol of the state and of the unity of the people of Japan**, while always wishing for the happiness of the people and the peace of the world, **turning my thoughts to the people and standing by them**,”

What kinds of attitude in 126<sup>th</sup> Emperor within and without constitution?



**Holding four-time parties for state guests, executives, and distinguished guests**




**Legendary attitude in Empirical family to people**





## 大嘗祭 first ceremonial offering of rice by newly-enthroned Emperor 8



大嘗祭 (平成2年11月22~23日)

Prince Akishino's recent remark questioning the government decision to use state funds for a key Imperial family ritual following the ascension of the new emperor next year may rekindle the discussion over separation of state and religion under the Constitution in connection with Shinto-linked Imperial rituals.



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9

## What is political legitimacy in Japan?

### Imperialism

- Since 2<sup>nd</sup> century or 645 emperor had held hegemony up to 9<sup>th</sup> century, then aristocrats and warriors had seized power until 19<sup>th</sup> century.
- Meiji government invented modern monarchism.
  - Worship of emperor and national entity
  - State Shintoism



Emperor became the symbol of Japanese modern state.



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## After W.W. II and restoration of independence in 1951

### Constitutional democracy and monarchism

- Pacifism under Japan-US Security Treaty
- God-like emperor became human-like and symbolic one.
- Shinto returned to the composition of each shrine shinto, however, Yasukuni still remained a symbol of nationalism for some politicians as well as right wing.

### 75 years passed

- Ordinary nation still under Japan-US Security Treaty
- Emperor strengthened its symbolism in three generations.
  - Paternalistic, humanistic, and respected
  - **Unbroken imperial tradition verified the beginning of Japanese history in mythological age. It is not 1945.**



## Responses by Japanese denominations

### Celebrating ceremonies



Singon sect  
Ninna temple

Tendai sect  
Enryaku temple



Jodo sect  
Chionin temple

### Criticism by Christians



Breaking the principle of  
separation of politics and religions


Infringing popular sovereignty

Restoration of state Shinto?



### Japanese legitimacy in history and religiosity


Modern nation state 1986-1945




### Change of Japanese legitimacy and positioning

since 1945 up to 1998

Abe cabinet 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>





## Religion and politics in post colonial times

- 1 History
- 2 Legitimacy: Monarchy, Nation, and Religion in modern state
- 3 Developmentalism in modernization
- 4 New configuration of power

## Thai History

- + Mon Dvaravati culture from 7<sup>th</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup> century  
Image of Buddha
- + migration of the Tai from Yunnan in the 10<sup>th</sup> century  
Tai
- + Khmer domination in 11<sup>th</sup> century
- + Sukhothai Kingdom in 13<sup>th</sup> century  
Ram Khamhaeng  
Lithai Traiphumikatha
- + Ayutthaya Kingdom in 14<sup>th</sup> century  
Lan Na in Chiang Mai  
Japanese military battle against Pattani
- + Thonburi kingdom from 1767-69  
Taksin battle against Burmese
- + Chakri, Rattanakosin Kingdom  
Mongkut (1804–1868), Chulalongkorn (1853–1910)
  - Burney Treaty in 1826
  - Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909
  - French colonialism in 19<sup>th</sup> century in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam




## Sarit Thanarat initiated Developmentalism from 1960s to 1990s





Royal Project  
Sangha Project  
Military Project

National Unity  
Anti-communism  
Paternalism



Rama 9<sup>th</sup>  
Authority  
Mercy  
Wealth

## My books on Thai Studies



- 1 Development and Change of Culture in Northeast Thailand
- 2 Development Monks in Northeast Thailand
- 3 Social Exclusion in Modern Thailand
- 4 Thai Theravada Buddhism and Social Inclusion

## Comparative Study

	Khon Kaen Univ.	Sakurai, Northeast Thailand	Sakurai, Kamalaasai Sub-district
Survey Year	1991	1995-97	1997
Survey Area	Northeast (mainly in Central South)	Northeast (mainly in the Central North)	Karashin Province (Central)
Survey Method	reputation and hearsay	reputation and hearsay	complete enumeration
Number of Cases	28 (44)	32	71





## Findings Different From Those of Previous Studies

### Monks:

- First, the number of monks on the sites of rural development led by the **government and regional development NGOs** during the 1970s-80s or up to the mid-1990s.
- Second, monks who served as leaders in the development of social capital has been **on the decline**.

### Villagers:

- Few villagers including the village head expect monks to exercise leadership. Rather, many hope that monks will make **spiritual contributions at the temple**.

### New Trend:

- People nowadays gave more respect to monks who carry out **multifaceted social development with a charismatic air and a smooth preaching style, or a miracle-working prayer or practice**. (winning lottery numbers; various types of exorcism or good-luck prayers; osteosynthesis and massage )



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## Cambodia history

**Khmer Empire (802–1431)**

**Small countries and conquest by Siam(1431–1863)**

**French colonial period (1863–1953)**

**Administration of Sihanouk (1953–70)**

**Khmer Republic and the War (1970–75)**

**Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge era) (1975–79)**

**Vietnamese occupation and the PRK (1979–93)**


**Modern Cambodia (1993–present)**



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## Sihanouk seek modern nation state and the intervention by 24 nearby countries



## Myanmar history

**Pagan Empire (1044–1297)**

**Small kingdoms(Ava Pegu Shan Arakan)**

**Taungoo Dynasty (1510–1752)**

**Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885)**

**British rule(1886-1945)**

**Independent of Burma (1948-**



- Union of Burma (1948–1974)
- Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1974–1988)
- Union of Burma/Myanmar (1988–2011)

**Aung San Suu Kyi and National League for Democracy(2015-**





U Nu



Ne Win



Than Shwe

Aung San Suu Kyi



**1<sup>st</sup> Concluding remarks**

**1 typology of authority (administration=military)**

- Thailand: still authoritative based on three institutions
- Cambodia: weak authority based on neighbor countries
- Myanmar: equilibrium authority based on military and civic movement

**2 experience of popular movement**

- Thailand: from civic movement to authoritative nation
- Cambodia: from revolutionary crisis to semi-authoritative nation
- Myanmar: from authoritative nation to semi-democratic nation, except for other ethnic people



# Positioning of socially engaged Buddhism



## Engaged Buddhism in East Asia

### Westerners' perspective

- Theravada Buddhism
  - renounced religion: monkhood for self-salvation; layperson for merit-making: Monks are not expected to be socially active
- However, Thai Buddhism appeals social engagement:
  - Buddhadasa Bikku :Dharmic Socialism ,1960s Social Movement
  - Prawet Wasi and Sulak Siwarakusa: social reformer and thinker 1980-
  - Development Monks :1980~2000
- Engaged Buddhism Discourse
  - Thich Nhat Hanh, 1967Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire
  - Sallie B. King and Christopher S. Queen, 1996, Engaged Buddhism : Buddhist liberation movements in Asia
  - Engaged Buddhism > Engaged Christianity



# Engaged Monks in Thailand

**Naan, in Surin, between 1980 and 1990, as a spiritual leader: devoted his life to the revitalization of villages, as well as to the spiritual cultivation of the villagers.**

Izumi, Osamu, 2002, "Rural Buddhism and the Formation Process of the Leadership for Development: A Case Study of Development Monks" in Northeast Thailand, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Southeast Asian Study, vol. 7.

**Some monks trained the physically disabled and Japanese tourists to do meditation and hospice for AIDS patients and a community center were built on the premises of a Buddhist temple.**


Masayo Urasaki, 2002, The Destination of Diversifying Development Monks; A Case Study of the Emergence of Development Monks Involved in HIV/AIDS Care, Religion and Society, 8: 79-92.



**Buddhist temples and patient self-help groups have conducted the practice of care: traditional Thai medical treatment, Buddhist meditation for mental health, and their community's activities for their well-being.**

Yoshihide Sakurai and Kazumi Sasaki, 2014, 'Chapter 28 Theravada Buddhist Temple Taking Care of People Living with HIV/AIDS in Thailand: A Case Study of Phrabatnampu Temple,' Pranee Liamputtong eds., Cotemporary Socio-Cultural and Political Perspectives in Thailand, pp.445-463, Springer, NY.



# Positioning of development monks in Thailand





### **969 campaign**

- by Wirathu around 2003 and finally imprisoned for 9 years and released in 2012
- Aimed at to
  - Refrain from buying Halal 786 and related goods
  - Refrain from marriage with Muslim men and social ties with Muslim

### **Amyoda Batha Thatha.na Saun.-shauk-ye Ahpwe (MaBaTha)**

- Established in 2013 to protect nation and religion
- Succeeded in enacting the bill of no-conversion, approval of Myanmar females, and monogamy in 2015

### **Saffron Monks Network**

- Criticized Buddhists' extremism against other ethnic groups and religions
- Supported democratic movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi



## **Concluding remarks: Two types of engaged Buddhism**

### **Providing of legitimacy to politics**

- Thailand: Sanga has still authority to nation
- Cambodia: Politician has influence to temple
- Myanmar: binary engagement to democracy and nationalism

### **Providing of social service to people**

- Thailand: engaged temples remain in hospice
- Cambodia: engaged Buddhist network with NGOs
- Myanmar: monastic meditation center provides well-being to people



## Thank you for your kind attention

감사합니다 kamsa ham nida

“À¼×É#Ö, #19¼ kopkun maak kap

អរគុណច្រើន។ okun chula wan

ကျေးဇူးတင်ပါတယ် chaese tin badii

ありがとうございます。 Arigato gozaimasu



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# The Nature of Unintended Consequence in Max Weber's thesis on Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

Hashimoto Tsutomu (hasimoto@econ.hokudai.ac.jp)

Extended version, at the Workshop in Seoul National University 201911

## 1. Introduction

Max Weber's thesis on Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism is commonly introduced as follows: the ethics of ascetic Protestantism created a spirit of capitalism as its unintended consequence. For example, on the cover of Japanese translation of this book, the translator Hisao Otsuka wrote that this essay is "epoch-making in exploring the paradox of history that Puritan economic ethics, which hostiles the pursuit of profits, has actually contributed greatly to the birth of modern capitalism. However, this line of explanation, which is the most popular interpretation on Weber's thesis, must be wrong or inaccurate.

In the following, I would like to present an alternative view on Weber's thesis. Against the common view, I argue that there is conceptual disconnection between the "ethics" of Protestantism and the "calling ethics" of Protestantism. On the other hand, "the calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism" and "the spirit of Capitalism" are almost the same, as Weber pointed out. My view is that the conceptual gap between the "ethics" and the "calling ethics" of ascetic Protestantism explains the logic of "the unintended consequences of the history" in Weber's thesis, while there is no logic of unintended consequence between the calling ethics of Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism. These two concepts are not hostile each other but almost the same in its substantial contents.

## 2. The "ethic" of ascetic Protestantism

The ethics of ascetic Protestantism is, the most representatively, the doctrine and practice of Calvinism. Examples would include Calvin's disciple Théodore de Bèze, or John Knox, who was influenced by Calvin and organized a "Presbyterian" in Scotland. Weber, however, does not discuss the ethical practices of these people. While Weber explains the basic character of the doctrine of ascetic Protestantism, taking up the "Westminster Confession" shared by the British Calvinists, he does not discuss in detail the practice of each denomination that adopted this confession. Thus, Weber's concept of "ethics of ascetic Protestantism" is defined as an "ideal type" extracted from the practices of several denominations of ascetic Protestantism.

In our interpretation, Weber’s ideal type of “the ethic of ascetic Protestantism” is defined by the following two elements, both of which give believers motivational driving force to engage in the ethical practice of ascetic Protestantism: one is “double predestination,” and the other is “association (Sekte) formation” (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Two-polar definition of “the ethic of ascetic Protestantism”

The former element is the feature of psychological aspect of the ethic of acetic Protestantism. The latter element is the feature of institutional aspect of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism.

The psychological aspect of the ethic of acetic Protestantism would include the following characters:

- (1) People take the “double predestination” seriously and fall into “internal solitude”. People despair due to their ignorance to see if they are saved.
- (2) In the midst of such anxiety, people are urged to seek confirmation of salvation.
- (3) People think for themselves and then do one of the following:
  - (a) If he is a pastor, he will preach this doctrine to the people.
  - (b) He throws away his secular life and travels on a pilgrimage.
  - (c) He dedicates himself to a single occupational work by rationalizing all aspects of his daily life in order to get a sign of salvation.
- (4) He is more interested in the state of his soul in next world than in this world.
- (5) He has a sense of self-confidence that he is elected by God.

In those characters, (3) contains three variations of (a), (b) and (c). (3-c) is the most typical case and represents an ideal type of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism in its psychological aspect. Both a pastor and a pilgrimage represent rare case and their practice would not satisfy conditions of the ascetic ethic in our secular world.

The ethics of abstinence in a secular society as indicated in (3-c), however, is a very demanding request. In fact, if people do practice of rationalizing all aspects of his daily life while receiving no guidance from others, they would become frustrated. Or, if they do not practice it with their colleagues, they will also be frustrated. In fact, many

believers sought guidance from Calvin preachers. When the believers asked the preachers to teach, even if they listened to the doctrine of “double predestination” and fell into internal loneliness, their anxiety would have been resolved to some extent. They could have a hope that their soul would be saved in next world by following the teachings of the preachers. On the other hand, when their worries about salvation were resolved, their motivation to practice abstinence in our secular society would have weakened to some degree.

Weber must have contemplated the fact that it is not enough to follow preacher’s teaching in order to practice and complete the ascetic ethic of Protestantism. In order to ensure an ascetic life in a secular society, people who want to receive the grace of God through an ascetic life must establish an association by themselves and discipline themselves with each other. They can run a voluntary association, invite preachers in their assembly, and motivate themselves toward the practice of ascetic ethics each other. An attempt to organize such a voluntary association is another aspect of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism. Weber brought such a definition into his ideal type of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism, which can be characterized as the following:

(6) People form a voluntary association (Sekte) consisting of “elected people” and motivate each other to the practice of ascetic ethics. People participate in a community of autonomous members who are interested in salvation.

In sum, features from (1) to (5) are the psychological aspects, whereas (6) is the institutional aspect of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism. Thus, the concept of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism has two features in its definition.

We also would like to point out that there are additional characters in the latter feature which show their tendency toward ascetic work ethics of Protestantism:

(7) In order to obtain confirmation of salvation, people avoid contact with others and listen to God’s revelation (voice of the Holy Spirit) that works on their inner space in a quiet environment.

(8) This voice is a “voice of conscience”. The voice of conscience teaches them not to serve a “State as a violent device” and to avoid a life of aristocrat.

(9) This voice also teaches them to devote themselves to non-political but occupational labor in a secular society.

The features of psychological aspects and of institutional aspects, however, have historically different sources: the former is an ethical principle represented by Calvinism and the latter by Baptism (especially Quaker denomination). Individual denominations of ascetic Protestantism did not necessarily combine these two features. In fact, there is no denomination which represents the pure type of the ethics of ascetic Protestantism

with these two features. I would like to emphasize here that the concept of Weber's "ethic of ascetic Protestantism" is split or divided into two features.

However, we can think about the synthetic ideal led by the combination of these two features. It would be "an autonomous being of liberal citizen," who is independent of authorities such as the government and the church, and who would organize their own voluntary association, while rationalizing their everyday life thoroughly. This autonomous person of liberal citizen will build a new society, an associative society, with depending neither on market economy nor on the government organization. We can depict such an independent agent as the synthetic ideal of the two divided features of Weber's concept of "the ethic of ascetic Protestantism".

### 3. A Remark on Weber's definition of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism

For Weber, there might be another possibility to define the concept of "ascetic protestant ethics" as follows: "The ethics of ascetic Protestantism" is a practice with which people rationalize their everyday life through the power of religious belief. The "double predestination" is the most effective for this practice. The second most effective are doctrines and principles of organization formation such as "sanctification", "experience of having sigh of salvation in this world" and "association formation with longing (待望)".

This set of definitions covers only the first feature of Weber's ideal type of "the ethics of ascetic Protestantism". However, this definition of the concept of "the ethics of ascetic Protestantism" may not be compatible with "the spirit of capitalism." The methodical rationalization of everyday life also includes the spirit of what F. A. Hayek call "constructivism" which tries to control everything rationally and systematically. The spirit of constructivism is, however, connected with the spirit of socialism (or communism). If we define the ethics of ascetic Protestantism simply focusing on the first feature stated above, it would not be able to exclude the spirit of constructivist socialism.

The methodical rationalization of everyday life is linked to the formation of a socialist state that rationally designs and manages the whole society as well as civic capitalism. In fact, historically speaking, the movement towards a socialist state was linked to the Methodist in Protestantism in the UK. In England in the first half of the 19th century, Methodists tended to accept the idea of social democracy and socialism rather than capitalism.

Weber probably did not want to include these socialist implications in the definition of "the ethics of ascetic Protestantism." In order to avoid such implication to socialism, Weber seemed to add the second feature, namely a voluntary association (Sekte) which enhances pursuing profits under the condition of anti-state and anti-church human relations. If Weber did not add this second feature, the idea of the ethics of ascetic

Protestantism would not have been able to explain why it is connected to the spirit of capitalism.

The idea of “association (Sekte) formation” denies central authority and seeks a decentralized system of our society. Why did the practice of rationalizing everyday life in Protestantism not go toward the construction of constructivist socialism? It would be because Protestantism put an emphasis on the formation of free association (Sekte) and stopped the formation of a centralized government. Historically speaking, Germany, where the “association (Sekte)” was underdeveloped, provided a ground for the planned economy compared to the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus, Weber’s definition of “the ethics of ascetic Protestantism” needed to include the institutional feature of “association (Sekte)” so as to be compatible with capitalism.

#### 4. The “calling ethic” of ascetic Protestantism

In any event, our point is that there is a big gap between the idea of “ethic” and the idea of “calling ethic” of ascetic Protestantism. We insist that “the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism” loses the two features stated above in its definition. Max Weber characterizes the concept of the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism based on the writings of Richard Baxter. Baxter did not promote “methodological rationalization of everyday life” through the doctrine of double predestination. He eased this doctrine. He also took a neutral position over the struggle between voluntary associationism and church-based conventionalism in Protestant movement. He may or may not be seen as a Presbyterian. In addition, Baxter created his original doctrine which compromise the special grace theory (which gives people a sense of “elected” by God) and the general grace theory. He also emphasized the importance of action to acquire God’s salvation rather than emphasizing contemplation to welcome God in their inner space of the soul.




Figure 2. Richard Baxter’s eclectic stance

Since Baxter was good at finding compromises between the conflicted doctrines in Protestantism, he has acquired majority of readers across the denominations and was successful to evoke people to the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism in Britain (see Figure 2).

Note: Although Weber depicts Baxter as a representative of Calvinism, it is difficult to place him that way. He had a number of faces, such as a nationalist who criticizes the papal system, a moderate who does not show commitment to the Quakers and the Baptism, a compromiser of Presbyterians and independents who claims relative autonomy of the local church from the bishopric system, the pro-Lutheran who criticized anti-legalism and preached the need for good conducts, or an advocate of the new Aluminum. See Shiina [xxxx:xx].

Those people who practiced the ethic of ascetic Protestantism had their motivational driving force through either the doctrine of “double predestination” or the “voluntary formation of association (Sekte).” On the other hand, Baxter and his followers did not have these motivational forces. Then the question is what kind of motivational forces Baxter and his followers had. The answer is not clear at all. Baxter’s doctrine has been constructed in a compromised way among contested ideals. Nevertheless, his doctrine provoked people to the practice of the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism. How could he motivate people to engage in the calling ethics? What kind of psychological and institutional factors motivated people to practice the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism? Weber gave no answer to this question. We can just say that the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism has been motivated by various factors. In any event, the point here is that motivational factors of the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism would not be led by the motivational factors of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism. These two ethics are completely different in its psychological and institutional driving forces.






Figure 3. Relations between the ethic and the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism

On the other hand, Baxter’s calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism has two features that Weber did not pay much attention to. One is that the God prefers such professions that contribute to our moral society. The other is that in the economic domain, the God prefers such professions that earn high profit. If there is a way of life that combines these two characteristics, it would be a life of voluntary philanthropic activity based on a great amount of wealth which has been gained through market activities. In other words, it is an ethical ideal for the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism to earn high profit and donate it as much as possible.

This ethical view liberates people to pursue economic profit and requires complete donation of the earned to charitable organizations. The idea that combines these two features of profit-making and philanthropy would be called as “the neoconservative agency with public economic ethics.” This is totally different from the idea of autonomy of the liberal citizens discussed above, which is led by the combination of the two features of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism. There is a big gap between the ideal of the “ethic” and of the “calling ethic” of ascetic Protestantism (see Figure 3).

## 5. The Spirit of Capitalism

Here we examine the nature of the spirit of capitalism in Weber’s definition. The spirit of capitalism means “spirit of citizen”, especially results from the pursuit of profits. It includes “duty to grow capital, professional work ethics liberated from status system,

and interest in salvation (disinterest in the economy)". The spirit of capitalism is a spirit which is embodied in such personalities that is regarded as honest by strangers. It also has features of accepting work as a vocation, pursuing legitimate profits, and growing up in a disciplined environment.

Amongst these features, Weber uses the word "citizen" especially to indicate the features though growing up in a disciplined environment. Citizens must be diligent, deliberate, determined, and awakened. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, such spirit of citizen has linked with the idea of liberal enlightenment which functioned to make people leave traditional lifestyle and drive them into business in the economy of capitalism. The idea of enlightenment was useful in transforming people from traditional to modern way of life.

However, Weber points out that early bearers of the spirit of capitalism were not such people who carried the idea of enlightenment. For the early bearers, it was an ideal of life to work thoroughly without break, without consuming the profit till the end of their lives. This idea may sound to be irrational in any respect. Why did they wanted to keep working hard till they die? When they are asked this question, they would answer in the following way; "For me, this constant work has already become an integral part of everyday life."

In our contemporary situation, however, when asked, "why do you work so hard?" or "why do you just accumulate your asset and not consume it?", people would answer in various ways as shown in the following:

- (1) Because it has become my way of life.
- (2) Because I want to leave assets for my children and grandchildren on behalf of their happiness.
- (3) Because I want to have enough assets to show my honor and power in the society.
- (4) Because I want to be satisfied with my efforts to contribute the economic prosperity of our society.

All these answers are what Weber has mentioned in his paper on Protestantism. The first answer may be presented by the early bearer of the spirit of capitalism. To put it more precisely, it would be such an answer that accumulating assets though diligent work has become a part of my life and ethical requirement. The second answer may be given by traditional workers. As for this answer, it is difficult to distinguish between the spirit of traditionalism and the spirit of capitalism. The spirit behind this answer may be expressed as "traditional capitalist spirit". Weber seems to have thought that few people are working ascetically on behalf of the happiness for their children and grandchildren. However, there are some people with such a spirit. It might also be expressed as "the spirit of capitalism for happiness across generations".

Regarding the third answer, Weber states that, for example, in the United States,

people seem to work seeking for these social reputations. People work hard based on their interest in prosperity and power. The work ethics recommended by Franklin would be a precept in everyday life for such prosperity and power. Such a spirit of people can be expressed as “the spirit of capitalism for prosperity and power.”

Note: According to Weber, however, what can be called the “spirit” of capitalism is not actually in such a skillful life management, but more humble and sincere. According to Weber, the spirit of capitalism can be found in the examples of a few good businesspeople, in Germany. An example of a good German entrepreneur might be the ideal of a “capitalist entrepreneur.” Weber initially stated that Franklin’s way of life is an example of a “spirit of capitalism”. In another context, however, Weber criticizes Franklin’s way of life as “just a skillful technique.” Weber talks about “the spirit of capitalism” with the best German entrepreneurs in mind. Weber points out that they have an “irrational feeling” of performing their calling.

The fourth answer is a dedicated spirit. B. Franklin, for example, worked for economic prosperity by giving jobs to many people in Philadelphia city administration, as written in his Autobiography. Franklin also served as a Post Office Director in the City of Philadelphia and also founded the Philadelphia Academy (University of Pennsylvania of the later). He worked not only for his prosperity but also for the prosperity of his community. These work ethics also shows one of the spirits of capitalism. This could be called “the spirit of capitalism for social prosperity”.

Thus, we pointed out four types of the spirit of capitalism in Weber’s usage: (1) the spirit of capitalism which is internalized as duty, (2) the spirit of capitalism for happiness across generations, (3) the spirit of capitalism for prosperity and power, and (4) the spirit of capitalism for social prosperity. Among these four types, (1) meets the narrow definition and (2) (3) (4) meet the wider definition;

(a) Narrow definition of the spirit of capitalism: The ethos which seeks to earn money without regard to the happiness of children and grandchildren, without regard to their own social prosperity and power, but with regard to the ultimate value of proficiency and ability at work, taking their work as an ethical duty.

(b) Wider definition of the spirit of capitalism: The ethos which seeks to earn money with regard to the happiness of children and grandchildren, their own social prosperity and power, and the ultimate value of proficiency and ability at work, taking their work as an ethical duty.

From our contemporary perspective, “the spirit of capitalism in a narrow sense” seems irrational, whereas the “spirit of capitalism in a wider sense” seems reasonable. This is because the purpose of “for the happiness of children and grandchildren”, “for the

prosperity of oneself”, and “for the prosperity of society” can be seen as worthwhile to pursue for our life. These objectives have ethical values in our society.

6. Between the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism

On the other hand, the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism is almost the same as Weber’s “spirit of capitalism”, though there are three differences between them: (1) Replacement of the purpose of the life from “public good as glory of God” to “public welfare”, (2) Cancellation of some ethical demands (such as not playing sports) on how to spend leisure time and (3) Development of economic ethics from “liberation of profit pursuit” to “obligation of investment for maximum profit” (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Relations between the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism

One feature added by the “the spirit of capitalism” is the “investment obligation” in which the earned profit must be invested, not simply pursued and saved. This shows a more rational way of thinking about “capital accumulation”. However, as Weber points out, in the 17th century Netherlands, protestants with huge wealth already had an extraordinary interest on capital accumulation, while having a simple life. The calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism does not include such capital accumulation in their ethical obligations, but it is natural to think that Protestant people have gradually become to

accumulate capital.

Another feature added by “the spirit of capitalism” is utilitarianism in social governance. In other words, it is the utilitarian idea to maximize the public welfare of the whole society. “The calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism” thinks that charity work to improve society is important for the glory of God. To the contrary, “the spirit of capitalism” presented a more scientific way of thinking about the total amount of “social welfare”. This spirit has made the charity activities more rational and efficient in maximizing public welfare.

Baxter thought that wasting time was a loss for serving activities for God’s glory. Franklin, on the other hand, thought that wasting time was an economic loss. Franklin’s economic rationalism teaches that “if you want to be economically rich”, “the waste of time is a loss”. In other words, if you don't want to be economically rich, wasting time is not a waste. Of course, Franklin is not just an economic rationalist. He is a man who values the spirit of capitalism. His spirit would teach any person that “wasting time is a loss”. His ethical attitude is essentially the same as Baxter’s. Baxter teaches that we should not waste time. This is because wasting time is against the purpose of enhancing God's glory. “The spirit of capitalism” replaces the purpose of “the glory of God” with the purpose of “public welfare”. The ethics that time must be respected was first driven by “the calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism”. Baxter’s doctrine would be a representative example. Thus, the spirit of capitalism is a modified form of the calling ethics of Protestantism.

According to Weber, Baxter stood at a turning point to utilitarianism. This is because Baxter believed that occupational labor that served for the glory of God contributed to “public welfare” (or “welfare of many people”) at the same time. Working hard through a profession or a calling can increase God’s glory through the ethics of diligent work and such labor can enhance the public welfare of society at the same time.

We may think it is a matter of people’s subjective taste whether to work diligently through a certain vocation. We may also think it is a matter of people’s subjective taste whether we should contribute public welfare of the whole society. However, Baxter thought that one should work hard to increase the public welfare of society for the glory of God. Baxter’s calling ethics helped to justify the “public welfarism” that cannot be justified by simple economic rationalism based on individual preferences. He pioneered social governance utilitarianism (a position to change society rationally in terms of public value), which is different from contemporary individual-based utilitarianism. Baxter was at the turning point towards governance utilitarianism in recognizing the need for social charity.

In sum, “the calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism” and “the spirit of capitalism” are almost the same. The difference is that “the spirit of capitalism” lost the religious meaning of the glory of God.

Although Weber's "spirit of capitalism" has no stipulation on what to do with earned money, it must include rational consideration on the well-being of our offspring or on one's own social prosperity and power via the earned money in its wider definition.

As stated above, Weber's concept of "the spirit of capitalism" has both narrow and broad meanings. The spirit of capitalism in its narrower sense is the spirit which pursues the ultimate value of proficiency and ability in work of their own, having a sense of obligation to work diligently, while neither paying attention to the happiness of their children and grandchildren nor their social prosperity and domination. On the other hand, the spirit of capitalism in its broader sense is the spirit which pursues the ultimate value of proficiency and ability in work of their own, having a sense of obligation to work diligently as well, while paying attention to the well-being of their children and grandchildren and their social prosperity and domination at the same time.

In addition, there are two version of the spirit of capitalism in its broader sense. When we work hard and accumulate the capital on behalf of the well-being of our offspring, we might give our property to our intimate offspring, or we might donate our property to a charity organization on behalf of our common offspring in our nation state. The former donation might make our offspring less diligent, while the latter might make our offspring diligent, while increasing public welfare of our whole society. The former idea is a conservative one, while the latter idea is a neo-conservative one. The broader meaning of the spirit of capitalism includes the latter consideration, namely neo-conservative idea with caring our common offspring, with a perspective of utilitarianism for public welfare of our society.

It is this neo-conservative idea of the spirit of capitalism that is very similar to the idea of the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism. Both ideas pursue the commonwealth of the nation-state: the former pursues public welfare of people in utilitarian way, while the latter pursues public good i.e. social prosperity as glory of God. However, overall, as we have pointed out, the calling ethic of ascetic Protestantism is almost the same as "the spirit of capitalism." The latter is a developed version of the former idea.

## 7. Conclusion

The logical structure of Max Weber's thesis on Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism is often described as the ethic of Protestantism produced the spirit of capitalism as its unintended consequence. However, our examination suggests another view: (1) there is a big gap in definition between the "ethic" and the "calling ethic" of ascetic Protestantism. On the other hand, (2) the calling ethic of Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism contain almost the same elements, although in the latter, religious implications have disappeared. In our view, the thing that has seen as an unintended

consequence in the logic of Weber's thesis can be properly understood as the definitional gap between the two ideal types on the ascetic Protestantism on one hand and as the definitional similarity between the calling ethic of the ascetic Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism on the other hand.

We formulate Weber's thesis as follows.

(1) The synthetic value of the idea of "the ethics of ascetic protestantism" is oriented toward the idea of "liberal citizen." On the other hand, the synthetic value of the idea of "the calling ethic of ascetic protestantism" is oriented toward "neo-conservatism." There is a big gap between these two ideas in their synthetic ideals.

(2) "The spirit of capitalism" is almost the same as "the calling ethic of ascetic protestantism". The former is a modification of the latter in the direction of economic rationalism in two aspects: public ethics of social utilitarianism and private ethics of obligation to pursue the maximum profit. The ideal values of both concepts are oriented toward neo-conservatism.

(3) "The ethic of ascetic protestantism", "the calling ethic of ascetic protestantism" and "the spirit of capitalism" in Weber's terminology share the ethical feature of "methodological rationalization of everyday life." However, we have not discuss this feature in this paper.

With regard to (2), I would like to compensate the discussion above with the following sentence from Weber's text.

Our analysis should have demonstrated that one of the constitutive components of the modern capitalist spirit and, moreover, generally of modern civilization, was the rational organization of life on the basis of the idea of the calling. It was born out of the spirit of Christian asceticism. If we now read again the passages from Benjamin Franklin cited at the beginning of this essay, we will see that the essential elements of the frame of mind described as the "spirit of capitalism" are just those that we have conveyed above as the content of Puritan vocational asceticism. In Franklin, however, this "spirit" exists without the religious foundation, which had already died out. (Kalberg trans. p.157)

Einer der konstitutiven Bestandteile des modernen kapitalistischen Geistes, und nicht nur dieses, sondern der modernen Kultur: die rationale Lebensführung auf Grundlage der Berufsidee ist, - das sollten diese Darlegungen erweisen - geboren aus dem Geist der christlichen Askese. Man lese jetzt noch einmal den im Eingang dieses Aufsatzes zitierten Traktat Franklins nach, um zu sehen, daß die wesentlichen Elemente der dort als "Geist des Kapitalismus" bezeichneten Gesinnung eben die sind, die wir vorstehend als Inhalt der puritanischen Berufsassese ermittelten), nur ohne die religiöse Fundamentierung, die eben bei Franklin schon abgestorbem war. (S.202-203,

Otsuka trans.: 363-364)

Here, Weber states that “the spirit of capitalism” is the same as the calling ethics of Puritanism, i.e. “the calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism”. This means that the spirit of capitalism was not born as an “unintended consequence” of the calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism, but as a “result of the death of its religious foundation.” Of course, ascetic Protestants did not create the spirit of capitalism intentionally. However, the term “unintended consequences” usually implies “unintended heterogenous consequences”. What the ascetic Protestants have produced, however, is not very different from what they intended. It has produced homogeneous results; only the elements of religion have disappeared. In this sense, using the term “unintended consequence” would be inaccurate.

Weber asked the following questions at the beginning of his text: Why “the life of ascetic faith” and “the life of capitalist profit” in Protestantism have connected each other and are in an intimate relationship? The answer is here: there is a big gap in definition between “ethics” and “calling ethics” in ascetic Protestantism. On the other hand, the content of “calling ethics” is almost the same as “the spirit of capitalism”. Speaking of the intimate connection, (a) “the ethics of ascetic Protestantism,” “the calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism” and “the spirit of capitalism” shared the feature of “methodological rationalization of daily life”. (b) From the point of view of profit and public interest, “the calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism” and “the spirit of capitalism” are the same and are compatible in that sense.

In order to supplement the above discussion, I would like to quote the following text from Weber.

This investigation of the relationships between the old Protestant ethic and the development of the capitalist spirit begins with Calvin’s innovations, with Calvinism, and with the other puritanical sects. Nevertheless, the selection of this point of departure should not be understood as implying an expectation to discover the capitalist spirit in one of the founders or representatives of these religious groups (the awakening of which would then be viewed, in some way, as the *goal* of his life work). We surely will not be able to believe that any one of them considered the striving after the world’s consumer goods as an end in itself; that is, as an ethical value.

Moreover, one point in particular should be kept in mind above all: Programs of ethical change were not the central issue for any of the religious reformers who must be examined for this investigation, such as Menno [Simons, 1469-1561, founder of the Mennonites], George Fox [1624-91, founder of the Quakers], and [John] Wesley [1703-91, co-founder of the Methodists]. These men were not the founders of societies for “ethical culture” or representatives of a humanitarian striving for social reform or cultural ideals. The salvation of the soul stood at the center of their lives and deeds---



-and that alone. Their ethical goals and the practical effects of their teachings were all anchored in the salvation theme and must be seen entirely as the consequences of purely religious motives. Furthermore, we must therefore be prepared to note that the cultural influences of the Reformation were to a great extent (and perhaps even predominantly from our particular vantage point) the unforeseen and even unwanted results of the [theological] labor of the Reformation figures. Indeed, the cultural influences stood often quite distant from, or precisely in opposition to all that the religious reformers had in mind. (Kalberg trans. p.96)

Wenn wir demgemäß bei der Untersuchung der Beziehungen zwischen der altprotestantischen Ethik und der Entwicklung des kapitalistischen Geistes von den Schöpfungen Calvins, des Calvinismus und der andern "puritanischen" Sekten ausgehen, so darf das nun aber nicht dahin verstanden werden, als erwarteten wir, daß bei einem der Gründer oder Vertreter dieser Religionsgemeinschaften die Erweckung dessen, was wir hier "kapitalistischen Geist" nennen, in irgendeinem Sinn als Ziel seiner Lebensarbeit vorzufinden. Daß das Streben nach weltlichen Gütern, als Selbstzweck gedacht, irgendeinem von ihnen geradezu als ethischer Wert gegolten hätte, werden wir nicht wohl glauben können. Und es ist überhaupt vor allem eins ein für allemal festzuhalten: ethische Reformprogramme sind bei keinem der Reformatoren - zu denen wir für unsere Betrachtung auch Männer wie Menno, George Fox, Wesley zu rechnen haben - jemals der zentrale Gesichtspunkt gewesen. Sie waren keine Gründer von Gesellschaften für "ethische Kultur" oder Vertreter humanitärer sozialer Reformbestrebungen oder Kulturideale. Das Seelenheil und dies allein war der Angelpunkt ihres Lebens und Wirkens. Ihre ethischen Ziele und die praktischen Wirkungen ihrer Lehre waren alle hier verankert und nur Konsequenzen rein religiöser Motive. Und wir werden deshalb darauf gefaßt sein müssen, daß die Kulturwirkungen der Reformation zum guten Teil - vielleicht sogar für unsere speziellen Gesichtspunkte überwiegend - unvorhergesehene und geradezu ungewollte Folgen der Arbeit der Reformatoren waren, oft weit abliegend oder geradezu im Gegensatz stehend zu allem, was ihnen selbst vorschwebte. (S.81-82, Otsuka trans.: 133-134)

Weber explains here that Protestant ethics has created the spirit of capitalism as its "unintended consequences." Indeed, early reformers would not have intended to create a spirit of capitalism. They would never have thought that their sermons would create an attitude that would rationalize the world until they lost their faith. However, it is important to see that they also did not expect a preacher like Baxter to appear. Baxter became an ethical leader. Baxter's idea of ethics was disconnected to the previous Protestant ethics. Baxter's calling ethics has created economic ethics that is almost the same as the spirit of capitalism. Therefore, the logic of "unintended consequences" can

be explained by the gap between “the ethics of ascetic Protestantism” and “the calling ethics of ascetic Protestantism.” This is our interpretation on Weber’s “Protestantism thesis.”





**Whither Transnationality?  
Some theoretical questions in Asian cultural studies**



K. Moon & J. Jeon, *The Ways of Folding Space & Flying*,  
Korean Pavilion, Venice Biennale, 2015

Jaeho Kang  
Department of Communication, SNU  
SNU-HU Symposium  
Seoul, 23/11/2019


**Transition from Hallyu 1.0 to Hallyu 2.0**

	Hallyu 1.0	Hallyu 2.0
<b>Major points period</b>	1997-2007	2008-present
<b>Primary genres started</b>	TV dramas, films	K-pop, video games, animation
<b>Technologies</b>	Online games	Social media (SNS, smartphones) digital games
<b>Major regions</b>	East Asia	Asia, Europe, North America
<b>Primary consumers</b>	In their 30s-40s	Teens-20s included
<b>Major cultural politics</b>	Hands-off policies	Hands-on policies

D. Jin, *New Korean Wave: Transnational Cultural Power in the Age of Social Media* (2016, 5) &  
T. Yoon and D. Jin eds. *The Korean Wave: Evolution, Fandom and Transnationality* (2017)

## Transnationality of Hallyu 1.0

<Figure 1> Global Views of K-pop Videos on YouTube (2011)



Source: Reorganized based on "YouTube video clicks for K-pop reach 2.3 billion from 235 countries," *The JoongAng Ilbo*, January 2, 2012.

### a critique of methodological nationalism

- \_ territorial and cultural essentialism
- \_ cultural isomorphism




### a critique of cultural imperialism

- \_ displacement of the culture of reference
- \_ the polymorphic modernity

### a critique of cultural proximity

- \_ syncretic Asian modernity
- \_ affective form of imagining alliances
- \_ Asianess and cultural isomorphism

## Transnationality of Hallyu 2.0



### A critique of inter-Asian referencing

- \_ cross-border dialogue
- \_ 'East Asian experience of hybridization in negotiation with American cultural hegemony' (K. Iwabuchi)
- \_ 'Asia as method' (Takeuchi Yoshimi & Kuan-Hsing Chen)
- \_ a process of relativization by multiplying frames of reference
- \_ multiculturalism, cultural relativism, and cultural pluralism

### Hybridity as cultural globalization

- \_ the globalization of Korean creative industries
- \_ 'a national campaign' / 'a corporate-state project'
- \_ 'the contracultural flow from non-Western to Western countries'
- \_ a hybridized in-between space: transnational / translational




**Transnationality,  
Some Theoretical Imperatives**

**1) Trans-urban: City-Connectivity**



**2) Trans-culture: Cultural-Continuum**





**3) Trans-media: Communication-Convergence**




**Trans-urban**

- metropolitan culture and urban textuality
- networks of global cities
- post-colonial cultural circulation
- the creation of a hybridized in-between space







## Toward a critical post-colonial study of cosmopolitanism



Ahn Sung Seok, *Two-phase*, 2009

### **Global cosmopolitanism**


“a cosmopolitanism of relative prosperity and privilege founded on ideas of progress that are complicit with neo-liberal forms of governance, and free-market forces of competition.”

### **Vernacular cosmopolitanism**

“moving in-between cultural traditions, and revealing hybrid forms of life and art that do not have a prior existence within the discrete world of any single culture or language.”

\_Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (2004)

**Whither Transnationality?  
Some theoretical questions in Asian cultural studies**



Nam June Paik, *Internet Dream*, 1994.

Jaeho Kang  
Department of Communication, SNU  
SNU-HU Symposium  
Seoul, 23/11/2019






## 21st Century Sociological Imagination and Thinking: how can we facilitate the reconciliation and dialogue in East Asia?



- 한일 양국의 저출산고령사회의 실태와 대책, 그리고 시사점을 중심으로 -  
A Study on the Current Situation, Countermeasures and Implications of Low Birthrate and Aging Society in Korea and Japan

홋카이도대학 김창진



### 출생수·출생율·합계출생율

출생수: 절대치는 파악이 되지만 다른 집단과 비교할 수 없다



출생율: 출생수의 비율. 일반적으로 인구 1,000명당 출생수를 나타냄  
보통출생율 (= 조출생율). 단위 퍼밀리(‰)。

$$\text{CBR( Crude Birth Rate)} = \frac{\text{1년간 출생수}}{\text{해당연도의 인구}} \times 1000$$

합계출생율(TFR):  
출산가능(15~49歲)한 여성이 낳은 아이의 평균

$$\text{total fertility rate(TFR)} = \sum_{x=15}^{49} \frac{f(x)}{g(x)}$$


$f(x)$ : 「조상대상이 되는 연령  $x$ 의 여성이 1년간 낳은 아이의 수」  
 $g(x)$ : 「조사대상이 되는 연령  $x$ 의 여성의 수」

$$\text{합계출생율} = \frac{\text{모의 연령별출생수}}{\text{연령별여자인구}}$$

이 지표에 의해 다른 시대, 다른 집단간의 출생에 의한 인구의 자연증감을 비교 평가할 있다.

3

## 저출산화사회, 저출산사회, 저출산화하는 저출산사회



인구치환수준(replacement fertility) : TFR=2.1

초저출산국가(lowest-low fertility) : TFR<1.3(OECD기준)

4




図1 일본의 출생수와 합계출생율 추이  
출처 : 내각부 (2018) 『소자화사회대책백서』




図2 한국의 출생수와 합계출생율의 추이  
출처 : 「2018년도인구동향조사」 통계청 (2018)




图3 한일의 출생수와 합계출생율의 비교

한일양국의 저출산특징

- ① 낮은 수준으로 장기화되고 있다
- ② 속도가 빠르다

● 表2 한일 합계출생율(TFR) 추이


年度	1970	1974	1980	1983	1984	2000	2001	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2012
日本	2.13	2.05	1.75	1.8	1.81	1.36	1.33	1.29	1.26	1.32	1.34	1.37	1.37	1.39	1.41
한국	4.51	3.38	2.73	2.08	1.76	1.47	1.3	1.19	1.08	1.12	1.25	1.19	1.15	1.22	1.30

약 29년 (Japan 1974 to 2003), 18년 (Korea 1980 to 1998)



# 저출산의 원인

## 1-1 미혼자의 만혼화



출처: 후생노동성「인구동태통계」、통계청「인구동향조사」

## 일본의 초혼연령이 높은 지역, 낮은 지역



	높은지역		낮은지역	
	男性	女性	男性	女性
1 位	도쿄 32.4歲 (平均+1.3歲)	도쿄 30.5歲 (平均+1.1歲)	미야자키현 29.9歲 (平均-1.2歲)	후쿠시마현· 야마구치현 28.6歲 (平均-0.8歲)
2 位	카나가와현 31.9歲 (平均+0.8歲)	카나가와현 30.1歲 (平均+0.7歲)	야마구치현 30.1歲 (平均-1.0歲)	이야자키현· 기후현·에히메현· 와카야마현 28.7歲 (平均-0.7歲)
3 位	사이타마현· 치바현 31.5歲 (平均+0.4歲)	쿄토부·코치현 29.7歲 (平均+0.3歲)	카가와현, 에히메현, 오카야마현, 와카야 마현, 사가현 30.2歲 (平均-0.9歲)	오카야마현· 야마카다현 28.8歲 (平均-0.6歲)

出典: 厚生労働省「人口動態統計」

## 도도부현(都道府県)별 생애미혼율(남성) 전국: 23.37

단위: %


沖縄県	26.20	静岡県	24.13	鹿児島	22.60	<u>岡山県</u>	<u>21.60</u>
岩手県	26.16	千葉県	24.09	長崎県	22.57	<u>宮崎県</u>	<u>21.51</u>
東京都	26.06	鳥取県	23.90	大阪府	22.54	<u>香川県</u>	<u>20.93</u>
新潟県	25.15	群馬県	23.56	<u>愛媛県</u>	<u>22.46</u>	石川県	20.64
秋田県	25.10	北海道	23.48	愛知県	22.27	<u>和歌山</u>	<u>20.63</u>
青森県	25.03	島根県	23.21	徳島県	22.10	兵庫県	20.53
神奈川	24.93	宮城県	23.11	福岡県	22.04	三重県	20.41
埼玉県	24.83	山梨県	23.05	<u>佐賀県</u>	<u>22.03</u>	岐阜県	20.12
高知県	24.82	<u>山口県</u>	<u>23.05</u>	富山県	21.94	福井県	19.19
福島県	24.69	長野県	22.88	大分県	21.87	滋賀県	18.25
茨城県	24.29	山形県	22.81	熊本県	21.70	奈良県	18.24
栃木県	24.25	京都府	22.71	広島県	21.66		

출처:『인구통계자료집2018』(국립사회보장·인구문제연구소) 11

## 저출산의 원인

### 1-2 미혼자의 비혼화

「생애미혼율」→「50세시점 비혼율」  
50세까지 한번도 결혼하지 않는 사람의 비율



출처: 국립사회보장·인구문제연구소, 통계청「인구주택총조사」

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表 이상적인 자녀수보다 현실 자녀아이수가 적은 부모의 분포상황

(男性)										(%)
	N	<1-0>	<2-1>	<2-0>	<3-2>	<3-1>	<3-0>	その他	計	
20代後半	116	0.0	25.9	9.5	53.4	4.3	1.7	5.2	100.0	
30代前半	270	1.1	27.8	2.6	55.9	7.0	0.7	4.8	100.0	
30代後半	438	2.1	29.7	7.5	44.7	6.8	0.7	8.4	100.0	
40代前半	513	3.1	28.1	12.9	35.9	11.3	2.5	6.2	100.0	
40代後半	475	2.7	31.6	16.4	31.4	8.2	2.9	6.7	100.0	
年代計	1812	2.3	29.2	10.8	40.9	8.3	1.9	6.6	100.0	
* <>안의 숫자는 이상적인 자녀수가 왼쪽, 현실 자녀수가 오른쪽임										
(女性)										(%)
	N	<1-0>	<2-1>	<2-0>	<3-2>	<3-1>	<3-0>	その他	計	
20代後半	132	2.3	33.3	3.8	50.8	1.5	0.0	8.3	100.0	
30代前半	335	2.1	23.3	9.0	50.7	5.1	2.1	7.8	100.0	
30代後半	499	3.6	34.5	10.8	38.5	5.0	2.8	4.8	100.0	
40代前半	512	2.5	32.6	17.4	29.7	8.0	3.9	5.9	100.0	
40代後半	517	4.3	28.6	22.2	24.4	7.7	6.8	6.0	100.0	
年代計	1995	3.2	30.5	14.7	35.4	6.3	3.8	6.1	100.0	

출처: 내각부「부부 출생력저하의 요인에 관한 분석」

2. 기혼자의 출산저하

DINKs 라이프스타일의 증가



**DINKs**

Double Income No Kids: 맞벌이를 하면서 아이를 의식적으로 출산하지 않음

## 2. 기혼자의 출산저하



表 夫부의 취업・非 취업, 子녀유무별 일반세대수(일본)


	남편이 취업자			
	총수 (배우자의 취업・비취업)	배우자가 취업	배우자가 비취업	미상
부부가 있는 일반세대	20,387,797	13,080,450	7,271,587	35,760
자녀없음	6,611,403	4,139,823	2,449,344	22,236
자녀있음	13,776,394	8,940,627	4,822,243	13,524

맞벌이 부부세대	
13080450	
4139823	31.6%
8940627	68.4%

출처: 총무성통계국「2015년 국세조사」

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## 여성연령별조출산율추이(한국)



출처: 통계청「인구동향조사」

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
## 삿포로 육아지원센터 인터뷰조사

「이상자녀수는 2명이지만 현재 1명을 키우는데도 매우 힘들어서 포기할까 한다. 경제적인 이유도 있겠지만 고령출산에 따른 위험성도 있어 출산할 계획은 없다 (삿포로육아종합지원센터, 30대후반여성)」

「현재 있는 아이가 장애를 가지고 있어서 2번째 아이도 장애를 가질 것이 걱정이 된다. 특히 나이 먹고 출산하면 장애를 갖고 태어날 위험성이 높다하고 그래서 출산은 희망하지 않는다 (삿포로의 아동회관, 30대후반여성)」

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## 만혼화와 만산화에 의한 저출산의 메카니즘



사전적 대책: 초혼연령을 낮춘다

사후적 대책: 고령출산에 따른 리스크를 낮춘다

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## 저출산화와 고령화



고령화는 65세 이상의 노년인구의 비율이 증가하는 사회현상  
고령화율은 총인구에서 65세 이상의 고령자가 차지하는 비율

$$\text{고령화율} = \frac{\text{고령자인구}}{\text{총인구}} \times 100$$

→ 고령화는 고령인구의 증가와 저출산이 그 원인이다

고령화사회 7% / 고령사회 14% / 초고령사회 20%(21%)

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## 급속한 고령화



### 고령화의 한일비교

年度	1970	1994	2000	2007	2018	2027	7%→14%	14%→21%
日本	7.1	14.1	17.4	21.5	27.7	30.7	24年	13年
韓国	3.1	5.7	7.2	9.9	14.2	21.8	18年	9年

세계에서 고령자 비율이 가장 높은 나라, 일본

세계에서 가장 빠른 고령화가 진행된 나라, 한국

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
# 빠른 고령화의 배경 한일의 베이비부머

구분	베이비붐 시작	베이비붐 기간
日本	1947年	3年間
韓国	1955年	20年間



베이비붐 시작시점은 일본이 8년 빠르게 시작되었지만, 베이비붐기간은 한국이 더 길게 진행되었고 급속한 저출산으로 인해 일본보다 빠른 고령화가 진행되었다

## “저출산”, “고령화”, “인구감소”라는 삼위일체의 인구변동




“2025년문제” 대두  
베이비부머 세대가 2025년경에 후기고령자(75세이상)가 되어 사회보장비가 급증하는 문제

## “저출산”, “고령화”, “인구감소”라는 삼위일체의 인구변동


### 서울시 인구증감

※ 주민등록자 기준



2020년경  
베이비부머세대  
65세 진입

2031년경 부터  
총인구 감소



1. 노동가능인구의 감소
2. 노동질 저하
3. 과도한 사회복지비용의 발생으로 사회보장시스템의 붕괴

...

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## 사회보장비용과 고용상황

일본노령연금 생애소득대체율이 2014년 62.7%

(한국 27%~ 36%)

GDP의 10%가 연금지출로 사용, 일본 복지예산의 70% 이상 노인복지에 사용 (미즈호종합연구소 미즈호綜合研究所)

저출산으로 인한 **생산노동인구의 감소**

저성장으로 인한 **고용 불안정(비정규직, 저임금)**


→ 후리타, 니트족 (Not in Education, Employment or Training)

파라다이스 싱글 (山田, 2000)

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
## 현재 일본의 화두는?



増田 寛也(2014)

### 지방소멸

저출산초고령사회의 도래와 동경 일극화가 초래한 인구급감



### 지방창생

지방 살리기, 지역 부흥



지역을 기반으로 하는 지속가능한 케어시스템 구축



초저출산화 진행되는 동아시아에서 「더블 케어」 문제는 동아시아 공통의 사회적 리스크가 되고 있다 (Souma · Yamasita, 2017) .

- 늦은 출산으로 육아기와 부모를 부양하거나 케어하는 시기가 맞물려 이를 동시에 병행해야 하는 케어문제

가족규모의 축소 및 가족케어기능의 저하

- 고령자케어와 아동케어를 포함하는 새로운 케어복지시스템의 구축이 매우 시급하다.



# 일본의 사례



## 토야마형 富山型 데이서비스(공생형 共生型 데이서비스)

토야마형 데이서비스는 1993년 소만, 니시무라 등 3명의 간호사가  
현내에 처음으로 민간 데이서비스 “코노유비도마레”를 창업함

<p><b>이용자</b> 언제든, 누구든 받아드린다 요개호 고령자, 장애아(인), 학동, 영유아의 일시 보육</p>	<p><b>케어환경</b> 가족처럼 생활하는 제2의 집 규모가 작은 가족적인 분위기</p>	<p><b>지역</b> 가까운 이웃집에 놀러가는 감각 살아서 익숙한 지역에 있는 가까운 집</p>
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

→ 지역밀착형 시설, 소규모다기능 시설의 전국적 전개



# 토야마현



## 토야마형 富山型 데이서비스 시온의 집



## 시온의 집



사진① : 「信」



고령기의 역할상실 -> 역할부여  
지역참여: 일상적참여, 행사적참여  
세대간교류: 일시보육 아동과의 교류 및 상호작용  
더블케어: 영유아와 고령자 케어를 동시 수행

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## 일본의 노인복지시설의 시사점



향후 한국형 2025문제를 해결하기 위한 지역 기반으로 하는 고령자케어시스템의 도입이 시급함

### 공생형 데이서비스


- ① 고령자, 아동, 장애인 구분이 누구나 이용 가능
- ② 살던 지역에서 계속 생활할 수 있다
- ③ 가족적인 분위기와 관계 형성

소규모시설, 다기능, 지역밀착 시설(지역의 빈집을 개조하여 이용)

고령기의 역할상실 -> 고령자의 역할부여  
지역참여: 일상적참여, 행사적참여  
세대간교류: 일시보육 아동과의 교류 및 상호작용  
더블케어: 영유아와 고령자 케어를 동시 수행

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# 한국 완도군 사례



## 경로당 사진1)





## 경로당 사진2)



## 한국의 노인복지시설의 시사점



일본은 2006년 개호보험제도 개혁이후 개호예방과 프로그램 개발이 중요한 과제

### 경로당

- ①고령자의 의한 주체적 운영
- ②국가와 지자체의 지원체제
- ③접근의 용이성

소규모시설, 소기능, 지역밀착 시설(지역의 빈집을 개조하여 이용)

일본의 개호예방정책, 고령자를 위한 지역 복지시스템을 고려할때 경로당의 이와 같은 특징은 일본고령자복지시설의 설립과 운영에 좋은 시사점이 되리라 생각한다.









# Bar Examination as an Assemblage of Desire for Korean Youth : Focusing on the journal <考試界>

KIM Hong-Jung, KIM Yuha, KIM Jung Hwan, RYU Yeunmee  
/  
Sociology, SNU

## CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

EXAMINEES  
AND  
BAR EXAMINATION

BECOMING  
AN  
EXAMINEE

ASSEMBLAGE  
OF  
DESIRE

CONCLUSION

# INTRODUCTION



## RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

- What is the bar examination(司法試驗) in Korean society?
- Can the concept of institution(制度) help us to understand the 司法試驗?
- Everybody knows, we Koreans, that bar exam is the most prestigious form of test enjoying the highest reputation, honor, and social recognition
- Many young people have been rushing to the bar exam to become a lawyer
- It's not a simple institution which is ordinarily considered as impersonal, neutral, or objective; but what we would like to call the 'vortex of desire' into which enormous psychic energy of the society is rushing
- Not Durkheimian social institution but Gabriel Tarde's flows of desire and belief; or DeleuzoGuattarian assemblage of desire
- Bar exam as dynamic, energetic, and affective machine which attracts desire of the young people, and selects them

# INTRODUCTION

## DATA AND METHOD

- Narrative analysis of the memoirs written by successful examinees of bar examination in <考試界>, the most representative Korean journal regarding national examinations
- 406 memoirs published between 1980 and 2018 as data
- Memoirs in the form of autobiography, mainly including narratives of college life, difficulties during the preparation, circumstances and feelings regarding passing the examination and advices for studying and organizing their lives for the examination



## EXAMINEES AND BAR EXAMINATION

### KOREAN YOUTHS AS EXAMINEES

- Korean youths as 'examinees(受驗生)' in terms of their everyday tasks and problems
- An examinee is a specific type of actor who faces selection process through various tests, aims to pass these tests, and tries to regulate her/himself in an examinee-lifestyle by acquiring and training knowledge and skills demanded by the tests
- An image of youths as examinees is becoming a prominent phenomenon in 21<sup>st</sup> century Korean society characterized by neoliberal restructuring
- Test, defined as an institutional system to fairly measure an individual's merit and effort, is a deep-rooted feature in East Asian societies
- Tests have especially performed a significant function in Korea's developmental growth and are being maintained in college entrance and employment


## EXAMINEES AND BAR EXAMINATION

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ①




# EXAMINEES AND BAR EXAMINATION

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ②



# EXAMINEES AND BAR EXAMINATION

## A BRIEF HISTORY OF BAR EXAMINATION IN KOREA



- Until the abolition of the examination in 2017 due to the introduction of the law school system, more than 700,000 examinees challenged the test with mere 2.94% of those being successful

## EXAMINEES AND BAR EXAMINATION

### A BRIEF HISTORY OF BAR EXAMINATION IN KOREA

- Bar examination considered as the most authoritative and desired of all examinations
- While considered as the most difficult examination of all, the opportunity to take the test was open to all individuals regardless of their nationality, gender, age or level of education
- Bar examination symbolized as a fair ladder of hope for moving up in social class
- Empowering the belief that individuals of different circumstances can overcome their limitations by putting time and efforts

## BECOMING AN EXAMINEE

### INITIATION

- Reconstituting a process of becoming an examinee(initiation-confinement-renunciation-sacrifice-pass/future) through the narrative analysis of the memoirs written by successful examinees

#### Initiation

*"Considering the scarcity of the exam and thinking about future problems, and combining my longing for becoming a judge dreamed vaguely from a young age, passing the bar examination seemed to be the most obvious investment in college."*{1987/4: 349}

- Drawn to bar examination by path dependency or a certain kind of power as 'fate'

## BECOMING AN EXAMINEE

### CONFINEMENT

#### Confinement

*"You have to live a regular life. A life of an examinee must be monotonous, because only in that way the uninteresting study of law can become interesting."*(2012/2: 181)

- A process of an examinee turning into a study-machine by organizing a specific form of time/space and completely hiding in it
- Temporality of an examinee  
: rearranging all the time around exam studies, leaving no other time to interrupt such as social life
- Spatiality of an examinee  
: space of an examinee including in study spaces in college, temples, gosiwons(考試院) and reading rooms block the outside and suppress movement

## BECOMING AN EXAMINEE

### ASCETICISM

#### Asceticism

*"After refusing to take a bath because of the lack of time to go take a bath in the nearby stream, I ended up with a skin disease. I also reduced my eating amount to under one bowl of rice to shorten the time for eating, and returned to my desk right after finishing eating."*(1980/11: 217)

- Practices of patience, self-denial and discipline are passed down and ritually repeated
- As examinees keep failing to pass the exam and the period for exam preparation gets extended, all kinds of physical and mental pathologies(including suicidal thoughts) occur

## BECOMING AN EXAMINEE

### SACRIFICE

#### Sacrifice

*"My wife said, 'Our son is in hospital but there's no one to take care of him, so if you could...' I yelled at her and left for the temple again." (1988/4: 347)*

- Instrumentalization of intimacy  
: the examinees require support and help from their family members and close relationships, and sacrifices are required in this process. Only relationships that are helpful for the examinees are approved
- Justification of sacrifices  
: the examinees and the close relationships share the expectation of reward
- Life of an examinee is a long process of justification that works through the rewards expected in the future, and passing the exam is an event that finally approves this process

## BECOMING AN EXAMINEE

### PASS/FUTURITY

#### Pass/Futurity

*"As I got the Seoul Newspaper from the rural town office and found my name on it, the sound of the timpani among the wind in Beethoven Choral Symphony vibrated in my head." (1990/4: 356)*

- Desire of the future  
: faith and desire for passing the examination, and the future after that, support the life of examinees. This dream for the pass is the 'source of the capacity to act' and the power to produce and transform daily practices in pursuit of seemingly impossible task
- Future of the desire  
: successful examinees have accomplished the task to pass, but as soon as they pass the examination this task is endlessly extended to a new future

## ASSEMBLAGE OF DESIRE

### AGENTIALIZING PATIENCY

- ① 受験 = 受難
- ② Passiveness of the examinees' passion
- ③ Activeness of the exam
- ④ 考試 as a machinic assemblage of desire
- ⑤ Desire as substructure
- ⑥ Vocation/calling

*"You'd better think that you are being tested for your patience and endurance to face the pain in the darkness, and accept that it is a trial you must take. (...) 考試 requires bitter tears."*(1992/11: 388)

*"How much this hurdle called 考試 can make a man feel painful and small."*(1995/8: 405)

*"It is not in vain to say that 考試 is my everything."*(1983/1: 261)

*"No matter what anyone says, I go my way in silence."*(1984/9: 270)

*"I don't want this path to be wide and smooth. Let me walk this path only, even if it's narrow and rough. Even if my body is shattered into small stones, let me roll down this path only."*(1985/5: 282)

## ASSEMBLAGE OF DESIRE

### SEMANTICS OF PASS

- ① The end of the examination/passion
- ② Ontological metamorphosis
- ③ Recognition, acclamation  
→ charisma
- ④ Justification of charisma
- ⑤ Superhuman effort
- ⑥ Holy family?  
: legal circle as a group of the successful examinee, of the chosen, of the legendary figure

*"I think the difference between looking up and looking down is never small."*(1981/2: 196)

*"My life has changed dramatically since I went to the Judicial Training Institute, and now I can feel a glimpse of what I have done."*(1994/7: 365)

*"The thought that 'This can possibly kill me' kept repeating in my head. But the only answer to this thought was always that 'Even if I die, I'll die while I'm doing it.'"*(1990/5: 321)

*"I told myself again and again that I had to give up being human until I passed the exam."*(2009/2: 230)

*"The examinee is not a human, but an endangered animal."*(2012/2: 181)



## ASSEMBLAGE OF DESIRE

### WILL TO POWER

- ① Power of the examination  
: seduce, fascinate, absorb, initiate, deprive, confine, select, empower
- ② Desperate will to suffer/endure the examination
- ③ Power of 合格者  
: entitled to advise, noble enough to be humble, right to have greater ambition, etc.
- ④ Yearning to be 合格者
- ⑤ The will constructs, operates, maintains, preserves the exam

*"Once you begin, you get inertia and it's hard to do anything else, and there's no realistic alternative." (1995/12: 392)*

*"考試 requires the maximum amount of 忍耐 anyway." (1988/6: 307)*

*"As the exam approached, I always tried to keep in mind that 'To endure is to win.'" (1993/12: 383)*

*"It was as if I had caught the world with a firm grip ." (188/8: 348)*

*"When I went through the tunnel of endurance, I became a stronger and more mature person, setting aside the glory of passing the exam." (1993/12: 385)*

*"The figure I always had in my heart during the preparation for the exam." (1991/9: 370)*

## CONCLUSION

### THEORETICAL REFLECTION

- Vortex(eddy) of desire not as a metaphor but as morphology of the social – movement, institution, fashion, viral phenomena
- Tardian perspective of the imitation, or flows of belief and desire
- Deleuzian concept of assemblage of desire, instead of Foucauldian *dispositif* of power
- The power of magical, fantastic, fictive image of the 'pass' should be given its theoretical due
- Desire of modern Korean society produced a whole range of desiring machines and devices absorbing enormous psychic energy of the social
- The bar exam as an abstract machine of will to power